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Glossary of Acronyms 
 
Laws and Programs: 
ARRA – American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009)  
EU-ETS – European Union Emissions Trading System 
GGRF – Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund  
GWSA – Global Warming Solutions Act (2006) (also as AB 32) 
SBIR/STTR – Small Business Innovation Research / Small Business Technology Transfer 
 
Government Agencies: 
CEC – California Energy Commission 
CalEPA – California Environmental Protection Agency 
CARB – California Air Resources Board 
CAT – Climate Action Team 
CPUC – California Public Utilities Commission 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
US-EPA – United States Environmental Protection Agency (also as just EPA)  
 
Technical Terms: 
CHP – Combined Heat and Power (also referred to as “cogeneration”) 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
LLC – Limited Liability Company 
 
Greenhouse Gases: 
CO2 – Carbon Dioxide 
CH4 – Methane 
N2O – Nitrous Oxide 
SF6 – Sulfur Hexafluoride 
HFC – Hydrofluorocarbons 
PFC – perfluorocarbons 
GHG – Green House Gases 
MMTCO2e – Megatons CO2 Equivalent 
 
Other Pollutants: 
CFC – Chlorofluorocarbon 





Key Carbon Pricing Programs 
 
European Union Emissions Trading System – (EU-ETS) a cap-and-trade policy for the EU 
that has been operational since 2005. 
 
Global Warming Solutions Act (2006) – (GWSA or AB32) is a California Law that established 
a cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions in that state. 
 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative – (RGGI) a cap-and-trade type policy coordinated between 
ten states in the northeastern US. 
 
British Columbia Carbon Tax – a carbon tax policy for the province of British Columbia, 
Canada. 
 
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Plan – (ESER) an environmental policy included in 
the past three Five Years Plans in the People’s Republic of China that includes beneficial taxation 
schemes for economic activities that are deemed as “low emission” and pilot emissions trading 
systems in large Chinese cities. 
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This is a study of the California Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) and the related laws 
passed to support it. The GWSA established a whole-economy cap on greenhouse gas emissions 
and established a series of emissions allowances which can be traded between companies and 
individuals on the private market. Using Limited Liability Company (LLC) registration data 
across 80 economic quarters spanning the years 1996-2016 inclusive, this study sought to test the 
theory that establishing a price on carbon emissions will induce innovation within the energy 
sector.  
 
This study was conducted as a time-series observation study of the rate of successful new LLCs 
registered in either the green energy or carbon energy industries, controlled for the historic 
failure rate of businesses and specific federal and state grants such as funding through the 
Million Solar Roofs program, or the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The study found 
that there was a substantial increase, both in the raw number and in proportion of total new 
businesses, of successful green energy businesses after the passage of the GWSA. However, 
most of the new green energy LLCs were solar energy companies, which were likely bolstered 
by the US$3 billion in tax incentives and other subsidies from the Million Solar Roofs program. 
When non-solar green energy companies were regarded separately, the study found that the 
GWSA had only a modest positive impact on inducing small business innovation. This study 
concludes that a carbon price alone will probably not be sufficient to induce innovative solutions 
to achieve carbon neutrality goals, unless the revenues collected are used to directly subsidize 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis was written to explore the impact of carbon pricing policies passed by sub-national 
governments in North America on innovation, entrepreneurship, and the livelihood of citizens in 
those regions. As national and super-national governments struggle to pass comprehensive and 
effective policies to address climate change, there has been a growth in the number of individual 
cities and provinces passing their own climate legislation. This has been common in countries 
like the United States where partisan gridlock and disagreement over the nature and extent of 
human-made climate change in the federal government has to-date stifled a national-scale 
decarbonization effort.  
 
In this chapter I will explain the problem I am addressing and my motivation for doing so, 
provide an overview of the history of carbon pricing policies in North America and beyond, state 
my research questions and variables to be tested before concluding the section with an outline of 
the structure for the rest of the study. 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 
It is impossible to tune into current events today without being confronted by the existential 
crisis of global climate change and its effects on everyday life. In 2020 alone, historic fires have 
ravaged Australia, Siberia, and the United States, destroying thousands of homes and killing 
hundreds of thousands of endangered animals; a record-breaking number of tropical cyclones 
formed in the North Atlantic Ocean, with the worst storms causing billions of dollars in damages 
(Podlaha et. al, 2020); and monsoon flooding in South-east Asia has destroyed crops and 
livestock, threatening food shortages in a region with a high population (Hollingsworth, 2020). 
 
These issues are most keenly felt by the younger generations. In 2017, the Global Shapers 
Survey processed questionnaires from 25,000 people ages 18 to 35 from across the globe and 
found that a plurality of respondents (48.8%) believed Climate Change to be the most serious 
issue affecting the world today. Perhaps more frighteningly, a majority of respondents (55.9%) 
believe their views are not being considered during governmental decision-making processes 
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(Brodie, 2017). This is fueling disenchantment with liberal values such as democracy (Tidey, 
2020) and capitalism (Riechers, 2019) that are the cornerstones of the current, historically 
peaceful, world order. Extremist voices on both the left and right in democratic nations have 
seized on these attitudes as well as new forms of media to grow their ranks, weaken democratic 
institutions, and encourage political violence. A recent survey showed a surprising and rapid 
increase in the number of US voters on both the left and the right who think political violence is 
justifiable (Kalmoe, 2020). This trend was shockingly demonstrated on January 6, 2021 when an 
insurrectionist mob stormed the US Capitol to attempt to stop legislature from certifying election 
results; the first time since 1860 that there was not a peaceful transition of presidential power in 
the world’s most stable democracy. 
 
Illiberal nations have also used the climate crisis to establish themselves as global leaders. 
Chinese President Xi Jinping drew a sharp contrast between himself and Former US President 
Donald Trump at the 2020 UN General Assembly gathering by promising to stop the growth of 
CO2 emissions before 2030, and to have the world’s largest country carbon neutral by 2060, to 
generally favorable reception (McGrath, 2020). The risk here is self-evident. At a time when 
skepticism of liberal values is high and increasing, an authoritarian superpower proving itself 
better positioned to address issues of concern to the global population while the so-called “leader 
of the free world” openly denies there is a problem at all could dramatically shift the world order 
towards one with little regard for human rights. 
 
Thus, solutions to climate change must not only solve the issue of decarbonizing the economy to 
prevent extreme weather, collapsing ecosystems, food insecurity, and air pollution. They must 
also reinvigorate faith in market economies and democracy by increasing material wealth of the 
whole population and empowering citizens to make decisions for themselves that will have a 
noticeable positive impact on their well-being. Although this seems like a tall order, several 
policy proposals have been put forward in the last few decades that could achieve these goals. 






1.2 Motivation for the Study 
 
I was fortunate to grow up in a world where democracy and capitalism were expanding, new 
technologies were bringing the world together, and prosperity was growing at unparalleled rates, 
allowing people the freedom to innovate. Through intelligent, bi-partisan policy decisions, the 
commercial Internet flourished and expanded at breakneck speeds, conveniently cataloging the 
whole of human knowledge and making it available to the masses. New companies went from 
dorm-room pet projects to household names seemingly overnight. Most critically, there was 
optimism for the future. Millions were being lifted out of extreme poverty worldwide every year, 
and countries were finally working together in unprecedented ways to address environmental 
issues – from reducing ozone-destroying CFCs and acid-rain generating SO2 to international 
summits such as Kyoto addressing the much larger problem of climate change.  
 
In the last 20 years, though, a coalition of ideological opponents to liberalism, and populations 
that felt disenfranchised or abandoned by the sweeping societal changes of the late 20th century, 
have worked to undermine capitalism, stifle innovation, and roll back democratic values. For 
their part, the proponents of liberalism have largely failed to portray how their policies work and 
benefit the typical voter. Those who support carbon pricing policy as a driver of economic 
innovation, from academics like economist William Nordhaus to politicians like former 
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, make a strong case for it in the abstract. There has 
been plenty of “real world” research on the impact of such policies on whole industries and large 
firms, but perilously little on the opportunities such policies present to average citizens outside of 
broad metrics such as jobs numbers. Thus, it is too often unclear how well, if at all, the theory 
translates into reality for the median voter. My goal as a researcher is to provide a critical 
assessment of one such policy so that its effects may be understood more fully, and lawmakers 
can make informed decisions about these policies as potential solutions to the climate crisis. 
 
1.3 History of Carbon Pricing Initiatives in North America and Beyond 
 
Prior to 1990, the idea that pollution could be reduced by fixing a cost to it was strictly academic, 
with support from economists on both right and left (Rabe, 2019: 5). The first such policies to be 
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signed into law were aimed at sulfur-dioxide (SO2), an industrial pollutant that was making rain 
acidic and damaging both the environment and human-made structures. The Clean Air Act 
Amendments, signed into law by US President George H.W. Bush in 1990 established, among 
other things, a cap-and-trade program for SO2. The cap-and-trade program established an 
economy-wide budget for SO2 emissions and allowed polluting companies to negotiate for 
reductions1. 
 
The Clean Air Act Amendments served as the inspiration for the EU Emissions Trading System, 
which launched in 2005 and was the first successful multi-national cap-and-trade system 
specifically designed to reduce CO2. Cap-and-trade legislation for CO2 was also introduced to 
the US Congress several times in the 1990s and early 2000s, but none ever became law. Cap-
and-trade policy for CO2 also failed to gain traction in the Canadian Parliament. However, 
despite the setbacks at the national level, 23 US states and 4 Canadian provinces either adopted 
CO2 cap-and-trade policies, or laid groundwork to implement them in the future during this time 
(Rabe, 2019: 45). 
 
California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the Global Warming Solutions Act2 (GWSA) 
into law on September 27, 2006, vaulting California to the spotlight on the international stage for 
being a leader in climate change policy. The initial goal of this legislation was to reduce 
California’s whole-economy CO2 emissions to 1990 levels3 by the year 2020 with further goals 
of reducing it 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 (CARB, 2015). The GWSA regulates seven types 
of Greenhouse Gases across the economy through a combination of traditional regulations and 
market-based approaches. The Climate Action Team (CAT) was created by executive order and 
loops eighteen state agencies under the umbrella of the GWSA to ensure emissions targets are 
met and industry and government both have the support and resources to achieve these goals. 
 
Following on the heels of California, the Canadian province of British Columbia instituted a 
carbon tax in 2008 covering roughly 70% of its economy. The tax started low, C$20/tonne of 
 
1 for example, by purchasing offsets from the government or another company. 
2 also referred to as AB 32, the ID number given to the bill in the California State Assembly, and by its acronym 
GWSA. 
3 Set to 431 megatons of CO2 equivalent. 
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CO2, and was raised incrementally to its present-day rate of C$40/tonne of CO2. Unlike the 
GWSA which uses the fees it collects to fund further regulations and public utility projects, 
British Columbia’s carbon tax provides a Climate Action Tax Credit to every citizen (British 
Columbia, 2020). 
 
In 2019, the Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution went into effect across Canada. 
This plan sets minimum standards for individual provinces to develop their own carbon pricing 
plans while levying a federal tax on the residents and businesses located in those which do not 
develop their own plans. The “backstop” price set by the Canadian government was CA$50/ton 
of CO2 equivalent (World Bank Group, 2020). Proceeds from this tax are returned as dividends 
to Canadian taxpayers to alleviate the increased costs of carbon-based fuels. At the time of 
writing, five provinces have their own policies on-line while the others have acquiesced to the 
federal tax (Government of Canada, 2019).  
 
In 2020, the government of Mexico embarked on a three-year carbon emissions trading pilot 
impacting just shy of 40% of the national economy to stress test the design of the policy ahead of 
a full launch (World Bank Group, 2020).  
 
Outside of North America, carbon pricing has found significant success in Europe, especially 
Nordic countries, with Finland and Sweden adopting carbon taxes in 1990, followed by Norway 
in 1991, and Denmark in 1992. Carbon taxation programs were also adopted in the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Germany, and the United Kingdom in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As mentioned 
above, the EU-ETS went online in 2005. Despite some early mismanagement and insufficiently 
high market pricing in the early phases of the program rendering it largely ineffective as a 
pollution control tool, it has ultimately proven to be both a resilient and successful tool in 
reducing the carbon-intensity of the European economy4. Further, non-EU nations like 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United Kingdom have either aligned 




4 In 2019, emissions from EU-ETS covered facilities dropped 9.1% (European Commission, 2020) 
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The People’s Republic of China established the Energy Saving and Emission Reduction (ESER) 
plan as part of its 11th Five-Years-Plan in 2006 in an effort to decouple China’s explosive 
economic growth from its pollution output. While much of the ESER focuses on strengthening 
traditional forms of environmental legislation, it also prominently features a reduction (or 
elimination) of tax rebates for exporter companies deemed to be high pollution or high energy 
consumption firms (Wang and Chen, 2010). This can be treated as a carbon tax because of the 
way it increases production costs on polluters at a set rate. Starting in 2013, China also began 
pilot programs for an emissions trading system of their own in cities around the country, perhaps 
most noteworthily in the Yangtze River Delta, to study the impacts and learn best practices for a 
forthcoming nation-wide system (World Bank Group, 2020: 11). 
 
With South Africa’s national carbon tax going into effect in 2019, there now exists some form of 
carbon pricing on every continent. As of fall of 2020, there is carbon pricing in 31 countries 
covering in total roughly 22% of global CO2 emissions. In 2019 these programs collectively 
raised nearly US$45 billion in revenues despite more than half of all covered outputs being taxed 
at less than US$10/ton CO2 equivalent, which is far lower than what most experts believe is the 
optimal rate to be to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goals (World Bank Group, 2020: 20). 
This indicates that these policies will be incredibly lucrative for governments and – for those 
nations which adopt a climate dividend – a powerful wealth redistribution tool. 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has delayed the implementation or expansion of many carbon pricing 
policies worldwide, to avoid stressing the already burdened world economy. There is a real risk, 
as we saw during the economic downturn of 2007-9, for carbon pricing to fall out of favor 
among stakeholders again. However, the sharp reduction of travel and associated pollution has 
also sparked a renewed interest in climate legislation across the world. Therefore, it is vital that 
political scientists turn their attention to the economic and social impact of carbon pricing in 
areas already under such regimes, so that policymakers have the analyses needed to fine tune 






1.4 Research Questions: 
 
Is there evidence that California’s carbon cap-and-trade might have induced small business 
innovation in bringing green energy products to market viability? 
Subquestions: 
1. Which power sources (ex. Solar, natural gas), saw the biggest expansion in innovation, if 
any?  
2. Which power sources saw the biggest decrease in innovation, if any? 
3. Is there evidence that other state and federal legislation might be correlated to expanded 




This Masters Thesis will test the hypothesis that a carbon pricing policy can spur economic 
innovation while also reducing CO2 emissions. This is a relatively new field of study, with the 
idea that a price on carbon first being pioneered in the 1980s by economists, although theories 
that government can induce desirable societal change through policy dates back many decades 
before that. The theory behind taxation spurring innovation will be explored in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
 
1.6 Units of Analysis 
 
In order to test the hypothesis, I will be looking predominantly at the change in the number of 
successful new businesses registered within the energy industry. This will be achieved through 
three layers of analysis in increasing detail: the proportion of new energy businesses relative to 
all new businesses across the study period, the proportion of new “Green” energy businesses 
relative to all new energy businesses across the study period, and the proportion of new “Green” 
energy businesses across individual sources of energy (ex. Solar, Wind). In order to focus this 
study more towards how these policies present opportunities to average citizens, I chose to focus 
on the registrations of a specific type of business, the Limited Liability Company (LLC). This is 
due to its tax and legal structure, which is the best, if imperfect, measure of middle-class 
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innovation available when looking at entrepreneurship. The reasons for this will be elaborated on 
further in Chapter 3. 
 
1.7 Significance of Study 
 
The study of carbon pricing as a mechanism to spur innovation is a field that has only recently 
developed as interest in decarbonization across the globe has increased. In April 2021, US 
President Joe Biden released a detailed statement committing to a 50% reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions5 by 2030, including an ambitious investment in blue collar jobs6 and research and 
development (The White House, 2021). While the plan itself makes no mention of a carbon tax, 
US Climate Envoy John Kerry (McCormick, 2021) and US Treasury Secretary Janey Yellen 
(Geman, 2021) have both indicated Biden supports a carbon price to help pay for his program. 
This comes on the heels of the government of Canada instituting its own carbon tax in 2019. 
Policymakers in these countries should be working with political scientists to try to develop a 
complete picture of the impact of these ambitious targets and look to understand how to raise the 
revenues needed for their investment goals. Understanding how carbon pricing and investment of 
those revenues impacted entrepreneurship in a North American context, such as this study of the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act aims to, will be vital for policymakers to make these 
ambitious climate targets a reality. 
 
1.8 Structure for the Rest of the Study 
 
Chapter 2 will cover the theoretical underpinnings of carbon taxation and policy-induced 
innovation in the private sector before establishing the specific definitions of terms used 
throughout this thesis and concluding with a review of other studies on the effects of carbon 
pricing policy. Chapter 3 will establish how this study will select its cases, measure its variables, 
and establish both internal and external validity. It will also discuss in detail the procedures used 
to prepare the dataset for testing. This chapter will provide the reader background on the 
 
5 Measured by the output in 2005. 




different environmental laws passed in California, and at the federal level, as well as information 
on how California’s energy market works. Chapter 4 will discuss the details of the data this study 
will use to draw its conclusions, where it is sourced from, and the results of the cleaning 
procedures detailed in Chapter 3, as well as quirks in the data that must be adjusted for. Chapter 
5 will discuss the testing of the hypothesis and the results of those tests by looking at trends 
within the California LLC market. Finally, Chapter 6 will draw final conclusions on the 
hypothesis and provide suggestions for follow-up studies.  
 
Citations will follow the MLA8 standard and be found in-text in parentheses. Throughout this 
thesis I will include footnotes for clarifications or asides that are not strictly necessary for 
understanding the core concepts of the thesis but nonetheless may provide useful context for 
readers unfamiliar with the study area.  
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
Chapter 2 will start by defining technical terms as they will be utilized for this thesis, 
establishing also the ontological and epistemological frameworks for this study. Next it will 
provide an overview of the theory of carbon pricing and how it relates to induced innovation, as 
well as an alternative theory of how government directly funds innovation in ways that are 
overlooked by economic theories on induced innovation. Then it will present a review of 
previous studies done on existing carbon pricing programs to provide context as to where this 
master’s thesis will sit within the body of political science work on this topic. Chapter 2 will 
conclude by establishing the specific hypotheses this thesis will test.  
 
2.1 Use of Theories and How They Connect to This Study 
 
Since most of the theories behind carbon pricing policies are borne from economics, which often 
prefers to think of individuals and institutions as fully rational actors, I have chosen to take a 
rationalist approach to studying the real-world impacts of such policies. Rationalism “is a 
normative and a descriptive model that speaks to how governments should thoroughly plan and 
critically analyze each policy decision, in terms of clearly stated objectives, goals, and outcomes. 
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Once decisions are taken, the subsequent program activity associated with the policy decision 
must be evaluated and analyzed.” (Mills et al., 2012: 118).  
 
From its inception, California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) was framed in 
rationalist ways. According to a 2006 press release on the legislation, “the emissions limit will 
stimulate new business opportunities, and provide new ‘clean-tech’ jobs” with one such 
entrepreneur quoted as saying “’venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are waiting for the market 
signal that now is the time to invest and innovate.’” (EDF, 2006) As you can see, advocates for 
this policy were making the assumption that business owners and investors were rational actors 
waiting for the right conditions to take financial risks. As such, it is sound practice to test the 
outcomes of this policy in the same manner. 
 
After establishing key definitions for terms I will be using throughout this theses, I will look at 
why Governor Schwarzenegger and his allies framed their support for the GWSA in this manner. 
To do so, I will provide an overview of two key concepts -- carbon taxation and induced 
innovation -- that provide the theoretical underpinning for the passage of this law. These theories 
are both rooted deeply in the field of economics, but there has been little concrete political 
science study of these policies as they have only just begun to be adopted by governments 
worldwide. This section will touch on the work of economists like William Nordhaus who 
pioneered the idea of pricing the effects of climate change into economic models, and the 
political science work of researchers like Barry Rabe.  
 
From there I will explore the theoretical backing to the idea that carbon taxation can be a driver 
of innovation, called “induced innovation.” I will provide a brief overview of the economic 
theory first posited by Hicks, with looks at other key works from Kennedy, Nordhaus, and 
Atkinson and Stiglitz, before moving to a deeper theoretical economic study specific to carbon 
taxation by Wang et al (2019). Following this, I will discuss the alternate theory of government 
as an entrepreneur that does more than just correct market failures in order to progress ideas 
through the innovation chain and to market, discussing some of the work of Marianna Mazzucato 
and a case study on the Port of Rotterdam. Next, I will provide an overview of studies done to 
measure the impacts of carbon pricing policies including economic studies on carbon pricing 
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policies in North America, Europe, and China, and studies on the impact to CO2 emissions rates 
of carbon pricing policies to provide context for where this thesis fits within the growing body of 
work in this field. Using these theories and previous experiments, I will establish a hypothesis to 
test in this study. 
 
2.2 Critical Definitions 
 
Carbon Pricing – any policy that applies a price per unit penalty on the emission of CO2 (and in 
some cases other greenhouse gas emissions) by polluters. There are two primary ways by which 
this price is determined – either through government policy directly setting it (Carbon Tax) or 
allowing market forces to determine the price (Cap-and-Trade). Carbon pricing is typically 
measured in a currency amount per carbon dioxide weight in tons (Nordhaus, 2007: 30). 
 
Carbon Tax – a policy passed by the government that sets a monetary cost for emitting carbon 
dioxide or other greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere and collects money from polluters. This 
operates in a similar fashion to sales tax, where it is only levied on a particular activity. Often it 
is easiest for governments to tax companies and allow them to distribute the cost of the tax to the 
customers through price increases, though in some cases, such as with gasoline taxes, the 
government collects the tax at the point of sale instead.  
 
Cap-and-Trade – According to the World Resources Institute a “Cap-and-Trade” system 
operates differently from a carbon tax because in this system, the government sets a specific limit 
called a cap on CO2 emissions and allows companies that have polluted less than the limit to sell 
“carbon credits” on an open market to other companies (Metzger, 2008). In a Cap-and-Trade 
system, the price of carbon is not set by the government, but instead fluctuates based on the laws 
of supply and demand. Cap-and-Trade pricing systems for CO2 emissions are typically based on 
the United States’s 1990 Clean Air Act, meant to reduce SO2, and was widely regarded as 
successful in its goal (Rabe, 2018: 5). 
 
Provincial/State Government – the United States and Canada are comprised of a tightly-knit 
federation of individual territories that operate as semi-sovereign entities, but are ultimately tied 
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together by the supreme power of the national government. These units are called “Provinces” in 
Canada and “States” in the US. Provinces/States have less power than national governments, but 
often pass legislation that is different, or in direct opposition to, the national government, 
allowing quite a bit of variation in laws depending on which area of a country a person lives. 
 
Innovation – Baregheh et al (2009), based on an extensive literature review of over 60 academic 
papers on the nature of innovation, define innovation as “the multi-stage process whereby 
organizations transform ideas into new/improved products, service or processes, in order to 
advance, compete and differentiate themselves successfully in their marketplace.” (Baregheh et 
al, 2009: 1334). This definition encompasses six key pillars: a systematic methodology by which 
innovation is created and adopted, the social entity (organizations, individual actors, 
teams/groups, etc.) employing this process, the means by which they are able to create and adopt 
innovation (technological advances, ideas, a consumer demand), the nature of the innovation 
itself (how it improves upon or solves a problem), the type of innovation (a new product or 
service), and the aim of the innovation (solve a problem, differentiate from similar innovations 
by competitors). This definition will be more concretely operationalized in Chapter 3. 
 
Induced Innovation – Innovation that is created, encouraged, or otherwise subsidized by 
governmental policy. More discussion on this can be found further on in Chapter 2. 
 
Energy Category – for brevity’s sake, this paper will classify energy as two broad categories, 
either “Green” or “Carbon”, depending on fuel type. 
 
Green Energy – There is, unfortunately, no concrete definition for what constitutes “green” 
energy among scientists or policymakers, as all energy sources have some negative impact on the 
environment. Since this study is about a set of policies that specifically targets greenhouse gases, 
it will use the most straightforward definition for Green Energy: energy that is produced without 
byproducts that will be taxed under a carbon emissions tax. The specific energy sources that are 




Carbon Energy – The antonym for Green Energy as discussed above. Carbon Energy will be 
considered all energy sources that produce greenhouse gases as byproducts that will be taxed 
under a carbon emissions tax. Specifics will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Fuel Type – The specific fuel that is used to generate electricity (ex. Solar, natural gas). Each 
energy type will be classified based on the fuel type they specialize in. Table 3.1 details how the 
fuel types were used to categorize companies. 
 
2.3 Carbon Pricing Theoretical Overview 
 
Market based solutions like carbon pricing are widely considered by both scientists (Rosenberg 
et al., 2009) and economists (Sylvan, 2015) to be an effective and efficient means of reducing 
pollution with minimal impact to economies. There are two primary ways to price carbon for the 
purpose of controlling emissions. Governments may control CO2 either through a price approach 
whereby a carbon fee (or tax) is levied for emissions and emissions rates will naturally decrease 
to a point where the costs of emission reduction are balanced with the benefits, or through a 
quantitative approach where governments choose the acceptable rate of emissions in tons of CO2 
and allow a market to develop for emissions permits (Nordhaus 2007: 30). This is commonly 
referred to as cap-and-trade. 
 
A key benefit of carbon pricing programs is the way in which they frame CO2 emissions in terms 
of budgets. The concept of a ‘carbon budget’ is gradually gaining mainstream acceptance, 
starting with the publication of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report which reframed how 
policymakers should approach climate goals. Instead of focusing goals on more esoteric metrics 
like global temperature gain or atmospheric concentration that tracks to an “acceptable” level of 
warming that finds the economic balance between catastrophic climate change and the heavy 
costs of mitigating it, the IPCC instead creates a “carbon budget” which represents the 
cumulative CO2 emissions of all human activity and sets a definitive cap at which all human 
activity must have a net-zero carbon output to avoid catastrophic climate change (Lahn, 2020). 
This type of framing allows policy-makers to more easily identify the ideal price for emissions, 
because it measures exactly how much of the resource (in this case carbon output) remains. 
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A Carbon Tax is, at its core, an excise tax just like other “sin taxes” on products like alcohol and 
tobacco which have been effectively implemented by governments to reduce consumption. These 
types of taxes can be traced back to economist Adam Smith who posited that a government could 
increase the price of goods by applying a tax to them (Rabe, 2018: 2). Taxes of this sort 
specifically designed to stop negative externalities7, such as the carbon tax, were first theorized 
by economist Arthur Pigou in 1920. They function as a price correction mechanism for “the 
divergence between ‘social and private net product’, for example production activities generating 
smoke from factory chimneys that create adverse consequences for consumers in the form of 
damage to buildings[…]” (Sandmo, 2008). Put more simply, the money raised from the tax on 
pollution would be used by the public to offset the costs of the damage caused by pollution 
incurred by those who were not directly responsible for the pollution. 
 
The Nobel winning economist William Nordhaus pioneered the idea of specifically pricing 
carbon emissions as a way to address the negative externalities of greenhouse gas pollution. By 
imposing a regulation or tax on polluting activities, governments can equalize the marginal cost 
of pollution with its social cost (Nordhaus, 2010).  
 
A Carbon Tax avoids the volatility of prices caused when emissions permits are traded on an 
open market, and revenues can be returned by reducing taxes on other goods or through a 
dividend program thus mitigating deadweight loss (Nordhaus, 2007: 39). Carbon taxes are also 
much easier to coordinate between countries, through the same mechanisms by which trade and 
tariff negotiations happen today, to achieve policy unification needed to solve global issues. 
 
There are some drawbacks to carbon taxes. It is difficult to measure the precise impact of the tax 
as individual laws could have loopholes or exemptions for trans-national polluters that would 
weaken or muddle them (Victor, 2001: 86).  When setting rates, countries would have to estimate 
how much they would need to reduce emissions through esoteric economic formulas that may 
not be intuitive to the voting public. The introduction of new taxes is also a difficult thing in any 
democracy, even if the money would be returned through other channels. Consumption-based 
 
7 according to the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, a negative externality is a cost of economic activity that 
is imposed on a party not directly involved with that activity (Laffont, 2008) 
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taxes are regressive taxes because they will raise the price of consumer goods which 
disproportionately impacts the budgets of poorer citizens. 
 
Whereas carbon taxes indirectly choose the “acceptable” level of greenhouse gas emissions, a 
cap-and-trade system directly chooses the “acceptable” level of emissions and allows market 
forces to select the price for exceeding that level (called the cap) through the sale of emissions 
allowances (Nordhaus, 2007). The advantage to this is that it allows environmental scientists to 
recommend a stable, long-term phasing down of carbon emissions directly and not have to rely 
on complex, and potentially wrong, economic models to estimate the correct “price” needed to 
hit emissions goals. A long-term timetable for the emissions cap also eliminates the risk 
associated with the “unknown” factor, making large-scale capital investments in carbon-free 
technology more palatable for investors and entrepreneurs8.  
 
The primary drawback to cap-and-trade is the trading mechanism itself. By allowing for market 
forces to control the price of carbon emission allowances, cap-and-trade systems can be prone to 
extreme volatility. This makes it difficult for businesses and consumer to do long-term financial 
planning around the carbon price, because it can change rapidly. For example, in the span of one 
month of 2006, the price per ton of allowances on the EU-ETS dropped more than 70% 
(Nordhaus, 2007: 37). Cap-and-trade programs are also more susceptible to corruption and what 
economists call rent-seeking behavior9 which can weaken their efficacy (Nordhaus, 2007: 39).  
 
In an econometrics modeling study comparing a cap-and-trade policy with a carbon tax one, Y. 
Chen et al (2020) demonstrated that a cap-and-trade policy resulted in lower overall emissions 
rates and higher rates of energy innovation than a carbon tax system. However, this conclusion 
only holds true to a certain point. The authors show that if a cap allocation is too high, the system 
will not work to reduce carbon at all. Thus, they conclude, policymakers “must rationally 
 
8 For example, if an energy company knows the carbon emissions cap will be 0 in 2045, and knows that a new 
natural gas plant will take 20 years to pay off at current operating costs, breaking ground on it in 2026 is not a smart 
financial decision. 
9 activities that reduce economic efficiency and pull money out of systems without adding value back, such as 
financial institutions purchasing carbon credits and reselling to manipulate the energy market. 
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allocate carbon caps and to determine total carbon cap based on the social target.” (Y. Chen, 
2020: 4) 
 
A third method also exists that is a hybrid of these two approaches, wherein a government could 
cap the price of emissions permits on an open market with the government selling additional 
permits at a set price, acting effectively as a tax (Nordhaus, 2007: 35-6).  
 
2.4 Carbon Taxes and Induced Economic Innovation 
 
The theory of induced innovation first appeared in economics literature in John R. Hicks’s 1932 
book The Theory of Wages. In it, he proposes that “change in the relative prices of the factors of 
production is itself a spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind—directed to 
economising the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive” (Hicks, 1963: 124). In 
other words, innovation will occur when it becomes too expensive not to innovate. Hicks’s 
theory mostly revolved around the price of labor increasing to induce production process 
innovation, requiring less input of labor. This theory was expanded upon in the 60s by Charles 
Kennedy who stated that labor costs are not the only factor that can induce innovation. Factors 
such as capital costs might be more effective from the standpoint of profit-maximizing. He states 
that an entrepreneur will “search for the improvement that reduced his total unit cost in the 
greatest proportion” such that “if capital costs are high, relative to labour costs, he will search for 
a capital-saving innovation.” (Kennedy, 1964: 543). We can see the early seeds of the logic 
behind the theory of induced innovation as it pertains to a carbon price forming – after all, if a 
company will save more by adopting carbon-reducing technology to avoid paying a tax or 
purchasing offsets than it would by reducing labor cost, it would logically choose the carbon-
reduction strategy. 
 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) posit two interesting points that are ultimately relevant to this study 
on induced innovation. First, that in the case where the benefits of switching to a new technology 
or process are largely external from an individual firm or industry, as reducing greenhouse gas 
output in power generation most certainly is, government should intervene to ensure firms are 
switching to the correct technology for a long-term horizon. Second, they state that a firm will 
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consider adopting a more expensive technology sooner if it expects prices to rise in the future, 
regardless of present costs (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1969). With this note, we begin to see some of 
the significant reasons why the California legislature and executive offices structured the GWSA 
as they did: providing stable, long term horizons on the carbon cap allowing businesses to 
estimate the future cost of emissions credits for budget planning, and directing money collected 
from those dividends to renewable energy projects. This will be detailed more in Chapter 3. This 
article is an important step towards understanding how induced innovation, which is at its core a 
microeconomic theory10, relates to whole economies. That in turn forms the basis for how a 
specific cost increase, for instance a price on carbon, would impact innovation across an 
industry. 
 
Getting to more specific theoretical research on carbon prices, a study by the Carnegie Institution 
for Science indicates that carbon taxes would spur innovation to find cheaper alternatives for 
power generation, making this a lucrative prospect for both developed and developing economies 
alike looking to carve a niche for themselves in our globalist society. According to this study, 
government policies that increase the price of carbon fuels have a direct effect in inducing 
development of, and investment in, energy saving tools. “The induced efficiency improvements 
not only help the economy grow more rapidly, delivering a higher standard of living than would 
otherwise be predicted, but also reduce the amount of energy consumed and carbon dioxide 
emitted per dollar of output.” (R. Wang et al., 2019). 
 
2.5 The Innovation Chain and The Entrepreneurial State 
 
However, there is also criticism of this idea, especially from a business perspective. Interviewees 
in Gianoli and Bravo’s (2020) study of carbon pricing in the Port of Rotterdam stated that a 
carbon price could be a double-edge sword, motivating companies in low energy-intensive 
industries to invest in cleaner energy, but leaving high energy-intensive companies with less 
money to invest in cleaner technologies. Cleaner tech for energy-dense industry, they found, is 
also not readily available. Since modern businesses are typically rational actors seeking to 
maximize profit, an insufficiently high carbon price could simply be written off by a firm as a 
 
10 one that focuses on trying to explain why and how single firms take certain actions. 
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cost of doing business whereas one that is too large could cause firms to invest in, or relocate 
plants to, a lower-regulation area. Both cases could potentially stifle investment in new 
technology. 
 
Mariana Mazzucato echoes this line of thinking, stating that “profit-maximizing companies 
invest less in basic research and more in applied research [because] there are greater and more 
immediate returns from the latter” (Mazzucato, 2011: 134). This results either in carbon and 
investment leakage as described in Gianoli and Bravo (2020) or in incremental change that 
would be insufficient to meet urgent climate goals. Mazzucato argues instead that the 
predominant neoliberal perspective with regards to innovation focuses too much on government 
policy correcting market failures11 and overlooks a lot of what public money is being used for in 
the innovation chain. She posits that induced innovation literature should shift focus to the 
government engaging in market creation through targeted R&D investment, a process that is 
overlooked in market failure literature. 
 
In this viewpoint, the innovation chain is not simply sustained by correcting a market failure, but 
by a series of state and private agencies bridging the gap between segments of a five-stage 
process starting with frontier scientific research to practical use conceptualization, prototyping 
and concept demonstration, product development, and finally bringing the invention to market. 
“In sum, the patterns we see in public financing for innovation in renewable energy, and clean 
tech more generally, are very far removed from the indirect policies recommended by a market 
failure approach.” (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017: 41). In Figure 2.1, below, we can see an 
illustration of this concept, where Mazzucato and Semieuk have identified agencies, both public 
and private, that contribute to each stage of the innovation chain. 
 
 
11 in the case of climate change, this would be fixing the market failure of greenhouse gas pollution in the energy 




Figure 2.1 Mission-oriented finance along the entire innovation chain in the renewable energy 
sector. (Mazzucato and Semieuk, 2017: 37) 
 
As I will discuss further in Chapter 3, this study will focus mostly on the last two links in the 
innovation chain, product development and marketing. In choosing to focus on innovations in 
bringing existing technologies to market viability (stages 4 and 5) in California specifically we 
take for granted the innovation process bringing alternative energy to the point of product 
development. We seek to prove that cap-and-trade is sufficient in and of itself to spur innovation 
in opening a market for new technology12.  
 
2.6 Similar Studies 
 
During my literature review, I found several similar studies that helped inspire the methodology 
used for this thesis. Most of these studies are conducted by economists, and there is a stark 
whitespace for political science studies. While the post-Cold War consensus in government has 
coalesced around the idea of blurring economics and politics, it is still important to look beyond 
econometrics and understand if the economic and innovation opportunities promised by carbon 
pricing are accessible to the individual persons, instead of just broad national or sectoral 
interests.  
 
12 This process is not a given even once a certain tech has developed to “Stage 3. Early-stage technology 
development”. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, Mazzucato estimates that only 1 in every 10,000 
compounds conceptualized to have a medical benefit will make it to market (Mazzucato, 2011). 
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In one study, Calel and Dechezlepretre utilized the European Patent Office (EPO)’s relatively 
new “low-carbon patent” designation to study the impact of the EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS) on the number of emissions-reduction patents awarded to large firms directly impacted 
by EU ETS regulations. They found that the EU ETS accounted for a 9.1% increase in low-
carbon patents among regulated firms, or an approximately 1% increase in low-carbon patents 
economy-wide that could be attributed directly to the regulation (Calel and Dechezlepretre, 
2016). 
 
Agnolucci (2009) took an industry-specific approach to impacts on energy consumption and 
employment in both the UK and Germany. He found that the biggest decreases in energy 
consumption in both countries occurred in the electrical and optical equipment sector while 
having minimal effect on employment within the sector, indicating that innovation in energy 
reduction might be more effective or feasible in certain industries than in others. Martin et al 
(2014) looked at the impacts of the UK’s carbon tax on British manufacturing plants across the 
three-year period when the carbon tax was in effect, but the EU-ETS was not (2001-2004) with 
the goal of comparing outcomes between fully-taxed plants and those eligible for reductions 
under the UK Climate Change Levy. The study found that the Levy resulted in a strong reduction 
in energy usage, with resulting CO2 emissions decreases of between 8.4 and 22.6%, with a more 
pronounced effect at the largest plants (Martin et al, 2014). The study authors conclude that there 
is no strong evidence to support the idea that CO2 emissions reductions in these plants was not 
the result of switching fuel sources and indicate that further studies should be done to determine 
how the plants achieved these reductions. 
 
Weigt et al (2013) in a simulation study using real fuel-consumption data in the Germany 
electricity sector, sought to understand the compounding effects of the carbon price instituted by 
the EU-ETS and renewable energy regulations specific to Germany. They found that a carbon 
price alone would cause the electric utilities to switch power generation away from coal plants to 
more modern gas-powered plants as well as renewable energy, whereas the combined carbon-
price and renewable energy support showed a more universal shift from carbon-based power to 
non-carbon. This study shows that in a study on renewable energy innovation, I must be 
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cognizant of other policies such as renewable-energy subsidies that may have a stronger impact 
on new businesses and patents than a carbon price alone. 
 
In a longitudinal study of ten industrial sectors across the three Scandinavian nations13, 
Enevoldsen et al (2007) found both an overall decrease in energy demand in high-energy 
requirement sectors and evidence of industrial plants shifting to alternative fuels that are less 
carbon-intensive in the years following the implementation of carbon taxes in those countries. 
The study also indicated that the failure to reduce CO2 emissions in specific industrial sectors 
with economic prospects that declined during the study period could be the result of competitive 
pressures and the new carbon taxes making it more difficult to make expensive investments in 
energy efficiency. This would indicate there potentially exists limits to the ability of carbon 
pricing policy alone to induce innovation. 
 
While the study of national and international carbon pricing is a nascent field, with a small but 
growing body of good work, independent academic studies on impacts to the economy of carbon 
pricing at the subnational level remain rare. Fang, Guochang et al offer a study of a pilot carbon 
tax program in the Yangze River Delta urban agglomeration14 indicated that ESER goals could 
be better achieved through carbon taxes or carbon trading in certain (wealthier) districts (Fang, 
Guochang et al, 2016) but offered no indication on how such a program impacts specific 
industries. 
 
Gianoli and Bravo (2020) concluded a qualitative case study on energy intensive industry in the 
Port of Rotterdam and the impacts on business operations and innovation of the proposed Dutch 
National Climate Agreement, which includes a high carbon tax. They found through conducting 
interviews that while carbon leakage15 was not likely due to enormous costs of exit and long 
timeframes to realize the cost of such a move, investment leakage16 was because the marginal 
cost of upgrades would be greater in the context of the lower profit margins already caused by 
 
13 Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. 
14 a region that includes the major cities of Nanjing, Hangzhuo, and Shanghai. 
15 companies moving polluting plants to lower regulation areas. 
16 choosing to upgrade existing plants in areas not subject to the carbon tax and allowing plants affected by the tax to 
fall into obsolescence, thus disproving the theory of induced innovation entirely. 
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the carbon tax. This study also found that a carbon tax alone is not sufficient to induce the 
implementation of new technologies in energy intensive industry, although the tax does provide 
critical long-term variable stability in the form of solid information about what the price of 
carbon will be year into the future. In addition to the tax, the study authors conclude that some 
form of subsidy or regulation to make investments in “green” technology is necessary.  
 
2.7 Establishing a Hypothesis for This Study 
 
This study is a time-series observational study of California’s GWSA, to determine if the passage 
of this act, and the cap-and-trade program of carbon pricing that came with it, produced the 
necessary conditions to induce innovation in bring green energy technology to market. If the 
theory of induced innovation in green energy by carbon pricing is to be true, then we should 
expect to see a marked, and statistically significant, growth in this stage of the innovation chain 
for green energy, even when controlled for outside programs.  
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Chapter 3 will be dedicated to describing the methodology for this study in detail. It will begin 
with an overview of the research design in the abstract, establishing the type of study, the 
methodological approach, and the research strategy. Next there will be an overview of how and 
why I selected California’s energy market and Global Warming Solutions Act to study the impact 
of carbon pricing on small business innovation, including detailed background information on 
California’s business culture, and the specifics of how its energy industry has operated since 
privatization. Next there will be a section on how innovation will be operationalized and within 
that context how “green” innovation will be operationalized, including subsections establishing 
the limitations and validity of these measures.  
 
The concluding three sections of Chapter 3 will discuss data collection and sources. The first 
section will be about how the data was sampled and categorized in preparation for testing. The 
second section will discuss the data analysis strategy and tests to be conducted on the data. The 
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third and final section will discuss the limitations to the data set and the approach to analysis and 
establish how the data can be generalized.  
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
As stated in chapter 2, this study will be utilizing the behavioralist approach to research, rooted 
in the foundationalist ontological position and the positivist epistemological school. In laymen’s 
terms, this study seeks to test a specific theory of behavior as empirically and objectively as 
possible. To do so, the study must seek to establish a causal relationship between an independent 
variable and dependent variables in a manner that can be replicated both within the region of 
study itself, and for other regions with similar independent and dependent variables.  
 
Sanders writes that for a behavioralist study any theory which claims to explain a cause of a 
phenomenon must be capable of being tested against an observation and must also be falsifiable 
(Sanders, 2010). The theory of induced innovation, as detailed in Chapter 2 fits this, as it 
establishes a cause (introduction of one or more pieces of legislation to establish a price on 
carbon), and measurable effect (innovation increases) and it can easily be falsifiable proving that 
there was no change in innovation related to a carbon price going into effect. Research of this 
design also seeks to develop explanatory and predictive models, with a methodology that is 
generalizable and repeatable (Furlong and Marsh, 2010: 192), as this study hopes to. 
 
3.2 Research Approach 
 
This study will employ a predominantly quantitative approach to research, utilizing statistical 
methods to show and explain a relationship between two variables in a way that is logical and 
consistent, and building on the methodologies employed by previous empirical studies (John, 
2010: 275). As reviewed in Chapter 2, this study will be joining a group of studies that seeks to 
quantify innovation and measure the impact of carbon pricing on such. Whereas the broadly 
subjective nature of what does and does not qualify as “innovation” can lend itself to either a 
qualitative or quantitative study, the choice to focus on how the energy industry has changed 
24 
 
over time by measuring new business registration as the chosen definition of innovation is 
inherently a quantitative measure. 
 
One feature of the quantitative approach is the fact that this methodology, perhaps more so than 
others, makes inherent assumptions about its test cases (Furlong and Marsh, 2010: 192). The 
reason for this is because the empirical method, as employed in the natural sciences, requires 
controlled conditions to isolate the effect on the dependent variable as caused by the independent 
variable. Trying to replicate laboratory conditions in the social sciences is difficult if not 
impossible, and thus quantitative positivist studies are open to criticisms regarding potentially 
overlooked causes, such as cultural factors, ulterior motives for actors, or other plausible causes 
why an assumed rational actor might behave in a certain way. To address this, I will present and 
respond to some potential criticisms of the methodology, results, and conclusions throughout the 
body of this study as well as build several validity tests when presenting results. 
 
3.3 Research Strategy 
 
Fortunately, there are also ways to emulate a controlled scientific experiment through what is 
called an observational study. An observational study is useful for testing a hypothesis when it is 
impossible for a researcher to apply an independent variable, such as determining what impact a 
specific economic policy has on a segment of the economy. As stated above, there is a concern 
about confounding variables lowering confidence in any causal result this study might find. 
However, Kellstedt and Whitten state that “if sufficient attention is paid to accounting for all of 
the other possible causes of the dependent variable that are suggested by current understanding, 
then we can make informed evaluations of our confidence that the independent variable does 
cause the dependent variable.” (Kellstedt and Whitten, 2018: 93). How I will go about 
accounting for alternative causes in this study will be detailed later in this chapter. 
 
This study will be designed as a time-series type of observational study, which is a kind of study 
tracking one metric across multiple time periods. It will focus on variation in the rate of 
registration of new energy LLCs in California over a twenty-year timespan, divided into 80 
quarters, from the 4th quarter of 1996 to the 4th quarter of 2016, inclusive. More specifically it 
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will be looking at the rate at which new businesses in each of two energy categories, green and 
carbon-based, changed over this time with a specific focus on the change in the growth rate of 
each category in the 40 quarters after Q4 of 2006 (when the GWSA was signed into law) relative 
to the 40 quarters before. 
 
3.4 How and Why I Chose to Study the Global Warming Solutions Act 
 
It is an interesting study area with an abundance of good, easily accessible, data. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, this research thesis will be studying the impacts of a carbon-pricing 
policy of a sub-national government in North America. One unique advantage of North American 
style federalism is the ability to use certain states or provinces as “laboratories for democracy” 
and test how policies might work on a national scale. One of the more famous examples of this 
was the creation of the Affordable Care Act17, which was largely based off a similar system that 
had been working in Massachusetts. Thus, taking the time to study state-level programs can be 
profoundly useful for policymakers in the national legislatures to learn from best practices and 
how to avoid policy pitfalls when crafting new laws. 
 
When selecting the policy for study, I established the following rules based on a combination of 
personal interest and what I thought would provide the most robust results: 
 
1. the policy MUST be a whole-economy carbon pricing program, either cap-and-trade or a 
carbon tax. 
2. the policy MUST have been passed exclusively by one state or province in North America. 
• cities or counties with carbon pricing were not to be considered. 
• regional collective cap-and-trade agreements like the RGGI in the Northeast United 
States were also excluded due to many confounding variables and differences between 
state economies. 
3. the policy MUST have been in effect for at least 10 continuous years at the time of writing, to 
establish a sufficient long-term trend after passage.  
 
17  colloquially ‘Obamacare’. 
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4. the policy MUST have been proven to reduce GHG emissions with verifiable scientific data. 
5. there MUST NOT be a national carbon price policy supplanting or supplementing the sub-
national one at any point in the study. 
6. the state or province in question MUST have easily accessible business registration data, 
including date of registration, industry, and whether the business was still active. 
 
These 6 rules narrowed down my choices to British Columbia and California from which I chose 
California. California is the largest state in the United States by population, and third largest in 
landmass and it has a carbon pricing program called the Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) 
(1), which has been in effect since 2006 (3). The GWSA also includes a traditional carbon tax, 
called a fee, on a select number of polluters, mostly those using or distributing fossil fuels for 
energy as well as concrete manufacturers, making it particularly interesting for its mixed-method 
approach at funding its own enforcement. California’s GWSA to date has not been uploaded or 
otherwise combined into a regional system, despite earlier intentions to do so through the 
creation of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI)18 (2).  
 
As I will detail below, the GWSA exceeded its 2020 GHG reduction goal in 2018 (4) and an 
executive order set further reduction targets for 2030 and 2050, meaning follow up studies to this 
one can be done in the future. California’s cap-and-trade system remains the oldest in the United 
States, and no national policy has received serious consideration in Congress in the last 20 years 
(5). Finally, California’s Secretary of State maintains a database of all companies registered in 
the state since 1859, including business descriptions and whether the company remains in good 
standing (6). This data was made available to the public at no cost through a Freedom of 
Information Act request by the Los Angeles Times in 2018. 
 
California is a leader in policy and business. 
 
California is, by all standards, a massively influential state. Its population is greater than that of 
the whole nation of Canada’s, and its GDP is larger than that of India (Saha, 2016). California is 
 
18 It is worth noting that several states in the WCI have since either aligned their climate targets to California’s or 
passed their own carbon pricing systems, but there is still no regional cap-and-trade system at the time of writing. 
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the birthplace of many internationally known companies like Google, Tesla, and Disney as well 
as the home state of the current Vice President Kamala Harris, and the Speaker of the House 
Nancy Pelosi. This influence has resulted in something economists and political scientists call 
the “California Effect”, which is the tendency for businesses to create products that match the 
regulatory standard of the strictest area in which they operate, especially in major economies. 
One study of the automotive industry found a ratcheting-up effect of environmental standards 
from countries with lower regulations that did significant business in areas with stronger 
environmental regulations (Perkins and Neumayer, 2012).  
 
California’s energy market is open for entrepreneurs. 
 
Since deregulation, California’s energy market has been rife with opportunity for entrepreneurs 
and established businesses alike. In addition to privatizing previously state-owned power plants, 
there has been ample opportunity for new energy technologies, small-scale power plants, and 
land leases for fuel like natural gas drilling and bio-digestors. 
 
3.5 Background Information on The Global Warming Solutions Act 
 
What it is. 
 
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (GWSA), referred to also by its legislative name 
Assembly Bill 32 (AB32), was signed into law on September 27, 2006 by Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger at a highly publicized ceremony on San Francisco’s Treasure Island. This law 
was followed up by Executive Order S-3-05 that set a longer-term goal of an 80% reduction of 
GHG from 1990 levels by 2050 (CARB, 2008: ES-2), while also reorganizing eighteen existing 
agencies governing California’s environment into the Climate Action Team (CAT) under the 
oversight of the Secretary of the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) (CARB, 
2008: 6). This law was built on claims that it would spur job growth and investment in new 
energy, and shortly after it was passed, that seemed to be coming true. In Q2 of 2008 alone, 




How it Works 
 
According to the 2008 scoping plan set forth by the California Air Resources Board (CARB), the 
GWSA’s primary goal is to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of the Californian economy to 
no more than 431 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent, which would represent a 15% reduction 
from 2008 levels (CARB, 2008: ES-1), and establish standards by which to track GHG 
emissions. The GWSA recognizes six such greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is obviously 
the largest contributor to climate change, but methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) are also regulated 
under this law (CARB, 2008: 11). 
 
The primary mechanism through which the GWSA seeks to reduce CO2 emissions is a cap-and-
trade program. As stated in Chapter 2, cap-and-trade puts a regulatory cap on total emissions 
from sources covered by the law. In California that amounts to approximately 85% of all GHG 
emissions. The CARB scoping plan recommended the cap for 2020 be set at 365 MMT (CARB, 
2008: 21). The declining cap and establishing a price on carbon emissions is meant to “tilt 
decision making toward cleaner alternatives” (CARB, 2008: 18).  
 
Recognizing that markets are imperfect and barriers, both financial and informational, exist that 
impede the adoption of new technology, the CARB plan to achieve the GWSA’s GHG emissions 
reduction goals also included several specific initiatives of interest to the scope of this study. In 
2008, the Board recommended targeting 33% of California’s energy generation portfolio come 
from renewables, which was signed into law in 2011. Pursuit of 33% renewable power was 
already being bolstered by a program signed into law the same year as the GWSA called 
“Million Solar Roofs”, alongside increasing methane capture at landfills and large dairies, 
coupled with building efficiency measures such as increasing the use of combined heat and 
power19. (CARB, 2008: 17)  
 
 
19 using combustion sources, such as natural gas, to generate electricity while ALSO using the exhaust heat to warm 
buildings or water. 
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The GWSA has been funded, since 2010, by the AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee Regulation 
which is collected annually on a per gallon basis on fossil fuels, working effectively as a carbon 
tax. Currently 250 companies are subject to paying this fee (CARB, 2018). The GWSA also 
receives funding in part through the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF), which is 
responsible for auctioning of carbon allowances to companies who need to exceed a continually 
decreasing cap on CO2 emissions for their operations. 
 
Carbon Reduction Results 
 
To successfully address the problem of climate-change through a market-based solution, a 
carbon pricing policy must foremost actually reduce GHG emissions. Fortunately, this study has 
been done already. California’s emissions dropped substantially since the law was passed, as 
tracked by CARB. According to a press release, as of 2018, total annual greenhouse gas 
emissions in California was 425.3 million tons per CO2 equivalent, which was already below the 
initial 431 million ton goal for 2020. More critically, the GHG emissions per capital rate was at 
10.7 tons CO2 equivalent, down from the peak of 14.0 tons in 2001 (Young and Clegern, 2020). 
Among US states in 2018, California has the 2nd largest amount of CO2 emissions for energy 
production, despite being the largest in population20 (EIA, 2021). 
 
Other Laws Passed to Bolster or Supplement the GWSA for the Energy Sector 
 
Senate Bill 1368 – GHG performance standards for long-term investments in electricity 
generation (California Energy Commission) Limits which power plants can be invested in by 
the publicly owned utilities based on GHG emissions, including building new plants or 
purchasing existing ones or capital improvements to utility-owned plants. While this law does 
not impact privately owned plants, these standards ensure the government is playing on the same 
field as the private sector with regard to emissions standards as well as push the publicly owned 
utilities towards contracting power projects from companies that specialize in renewable energy 
and thus would have an impact on the results of this study. 
 





Senate Bill X1-2 – Renewables Portfolio Standard Passed in 2011 on the recommendation 
from the CARB Scoping Plan, this law requires the amount of electricity generated per year by 
the state to be at least 33% of retail electric sales in California by December 31, 2020. Law 
makes this a requirement of electricity sellers, not producers, to procure the renewable energy, 
thus directing investment directly into power generation innovation. This law also establishes the 
long-term goal of a “fully competitive and self-sustaining supply of electricity generated from 
renewable sources.” (Senate Bill Number 2: 7). As this law was passed on recommendation from 
CARB for the successful implementation of the GWSA, it will be considered as part of the 
overarching law for the purpose of this study. 
 
Senate Bill 535 – Disadvantaged Communities While the original GWSA does require the 
legislature appropriates 25% of funds in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund towards 
disadvantaged communities, and 10% of the funds to energy projects located in disadvantaged 
communities, there was no clear definition in the bill as to what constitutes disadvantaged. 
Senate Bill Number 535, passed in 2012, rectifies this. While this bill does not directly impact 
the overall goal of broadly understanding small business innovation, several small businesses 
identified during data analysis were owned by people of color and women. Further study would 
be needed to see the specific impacts of California’s climate legislation on expanding 
opportunities in social justice. Regardless, SB 535 can for the purpose of this study be 
considered as part of the GWSA. 
 
Assembly Bill 811 – Contractual Assessments: Energy Efficiency Improvements Allows 
cities in California to enter into agreements with private property owners for the purpose of 
building renewable energy generation for the purpose of distribution to the municipality. It also 
allows the construction of the new renewable energy generators to be financed through municipal 
loans. This can provide needed startup capital for small-time businesses looking to get into the 






3.6 Operationalizing Economic Innovation 
 
Innovation is a broad term that can mean different things depending on context, and the person 
using the phrase. In the definition I listed in Section 2.2 above, Baregheh et al focus 
predominantly on business firms creating new or improved products, processes, and services, 
based on 6 pillars21. They acknowledge that different people will choose to focus on specific 
pillars based on their background or interest. As an academic researcher, this is double-edged 
sword. On one hand, there is no “wrong” answer for how to operationalize economic innovation; 
any measure of innovation that I choose can be justified by the underlying theory. On the other 
hand, there is an overwhelming number of directions my research project can take, and it can be 
difficult to keep a narrow scope on my research.  
 
My first step towards operationalizing innovation was to narrow down the dependent variables to 
one specific economic sector. Carbon pricing is unique in that such systems broadly impact every 
aspect of an economy. To quickly narrow down the focus of this project to one manageable by a 
single researcher with finite time, I chose to focus on a single industry that is a major producer of 
greenhouse gases: the production of energy for homes and businesses. 
 
Next, going through the 6 pillars as laid out by Baregheh et al. (2009) I chose to focus primarily 
on measuring innovation by the number of successful new LLC firms founded that specifically 
deal some aspect of generating carbon-free power. The specific method of innovation will be 
the creation and registration of new green energy LLC businesses, and their successful operation. 
These businesses will have the following characteristics in order to be considered innovation for 
the purpose of testing the hypothesis, based on the remaining 5 pillars of the Baregheh definition: 
the social entity establishing these businesses will be entrepreneurs from California (to the 
exclusion of those from out of state looking to expand a business into the state), the nature of 
the innovation will be businesses that solve the issue of increased energy prices for traditional 
carbon-based energy, the type of innovation will be businesses that provide new products and 
 
21 which, in review are: a systematic methodology by which innovation is created and adopted, the social entity 
employing this process, the means by which they are able to create and adopt innovation, the nature of the 
innovation itself, the type of innovation, and the aim of the innovation. 
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services in the field of carbon-free energy generation22, and the aim of the innovation will be 
businesses focused on reducing GHG emissions. 
 
Another way to consider this conceptualization of a business itself being a form of innovation is 
this. The precise product or service a specific business brings to the market is not important so 
much as it increases the overall market feasibility of green energy. For instance, two competing 
solar panel installers are not promoting novel technology, after all rooftop solar panels have been 
available for over 40 years23. However, these two solar installation companies may differentiate 
themselves in innovative ways such as finding techniques to reduce labor costs and installation 
time, or having innovative advertising campaigns and branding to make their product more 
appealing to certain customers, or even offering a unique financing plan to make the technology 
more immediately accessible. Mazzucato and Semineuk establish this kind of innovation as the 
final stage of what they call the innovation chain – where a company brings a new technology or 
technique to market viability24. 
 
Regulations for Businesses in California 
 
It is important to take a pause here to describe the two primary ways in which a new business can 
be registered in California: either as a corporation, or as an LLC. Both structures have 
advantages and disadvantages for a business with regards to regulations, raising revenue, and 
taxation, which I will lay out below. In this section I will also provide three reasons justifying 
why I chose to narrow my focus on just LLCs for this thesis. 
 
A corporation is a special designation given by the IRS for a chartered company and are among 
the oldest legal entities recognized in California25. Legally, these businesses are distinct entities 
from their owners for the purposes of financial liabilities, and while a shareholder’s stock could 
be worth $0, resulting in a total loss of investment should the corporation fail, legal actions 
 
22 be it building new power plants, installing solar panels or wind turbines on individual buildings, creating energy 
storage facilities, or researching new energy generation and storage technologies to bring to market.  
23 while they are increasing in efficiency, installers are rarely producers, they are buying from a separate supplier. 
24 See Figure 2.1. 
25 with the first corporations in the business data set I am using for this project having been registered in 1859. 
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against the corporation usually cannot impact the personal assets of ownership. Corporations 
have a more strictly defined, and largely inflexible, management and payout structure. 
Shareholders elect boards of directors that are required to have regular, documented meetings 
(Huser, S.). Ownership of a corporation is easily transferrable through means such as selling, 
gifting, or inheriting stock and a corporation does not disappear should ownership die. 
Corporations pay the corporate tax rate at both the federal and state level, which is typically 
lower than the present income tax for individuals, although this varies greatly with changes in the 
law. After the corporation itself pays tax, it distributes profits to shareholders through dividends, 
which are then taxed again, resulting in a “double taxation” (Huser, S.). Benefits, like health 
insurance or retirement accounts are tax-deductible by the corporation and are often used to 
incentivize talent into working for the business. 
 
Limited liability companies (LLCs) are a more recent invention, which started to become 
widespread after a 1988 ruling by the IRS allowing them to be taxed differently than 
corporations. Like a corporation, an LLC offers financial protection to its ownership and is 
largely distinct from the personal holdings of the individual who owns it. LLCs differ in their 
ownership structure in that there are no requirements for boards of directors or regular 
shareholder meetings, and power sharing between and income distributions made to members of 
the LLC ownership team are not tied to capital contributions made or stock owned as they are in 
the more rigid corporation structure. In exchange for this freedom, owners of LLCs are more 
limited in transferring ownership, which requires changes to the operating agreement itself26. 
Since an LLC is not a corporation, it is not taxed directly by the corporate tax, and all its 
earnings are passed to its members, which is considered part of individual income for each owner 
and is taxed at their respective tax bracket as self-employed income (Huser, S.). LLCs are also 
able to pass losses to ownership as well, which can be written off on individual income taxes 
from other sources and thus is an attractive option for a small business or secondary source of 
income. However, benefits like health insurance are NOT deductible from individual taxes, and 
since an LLC itself does not pay business taxes, it makes it more expensive for an LLC to offer 
benefits packages. 
 




Why Focus Only on LLCs and Not All Types of Business? 
 
There are three primary reasons why I have chosen to study LLCs, and why studying LLCs is 
important within the context of understanding policy impacts. Since being recognized as a legal 
entity, to proportion of new businesses registered as LLCs in California has grown from less than 
20% in 1996, to roughly half by the summer of 2012. This proportion has stayed steady since 
then, showing that both traditional corporations and LLCs are, for now, here to stay (see Figure 
3.1) and as such, there is merit in studying them individually. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – by 2012, half of all new businesses registered in California were LLCs. 
 
The change is proportionality also does not appear to have come entirely at the expense of the 





Figure 3.2 – LLC registration has not entirely come at the expense of corporation registration. 
 
The number of corporations registered per year is roughly the same in 2015 as it was in 2005 
while the number of LLCs has risen dramatically in that time. This evidence suggests that LLCs 
are not replacing corporations as the preferred legal structure for business, but rather 
supplementing them. This makes LLCs an important subfield of study when exploring the 
impacts of policy, especially one that is specifically designed to induce innovation within the 
economy.  
 
Interestingly, Figure 3.2 also shows a potential advantage of the LLC structure over the 
traditional corporation and one that is important in understanding how society responds to 
political and economic shifts. The ease by which an LLC can be formed, and the advantages of a 
looser structure for revenue sharing, appears to have made LLCs a more appealing structure 
during rough economic times. As you can see in Figure 3.2, there was a prolonged and sharp 
decline in new corporate registrations from 2007 until 2012, a time period that coincides with the 
“Great Recession” and subsequent fallout. LLC registration suffered a less substantial dip in 
between 2007 and 2009, but the annual rate of registration began recovering much sooner and 
more robustly. Not tying monetary payout to capital contributions, as corporations are required to 
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through the rigid regulations surrounding stocks, might make forming a new business more 
appealing to the risk-adverse during troubled economic times. From a practical standpoint within 
the context of my study, this also shows that I can make the case for not having to control too 
strongly for the Great Recession (2007-2009) in my data – LLC registration remained robust 
throughout the scope of this study. Since the policy I am studying was signed in 2006 and came 
into effect in 2009, the Great Recession could have created a false impression that the law hurt 
new enterprise, but the impact of that event on LLC registration appears to be minimal. 
 
Finally, the barrier for entry is much lower for individuals who choose to start a business as an 
LLC. LLCs are a line item on individual tax returns in the United States, and, combined with the 
loose corporate structure and minimal required paperwork are also appealing from an 
organization standpoint for small enterprises. Because of these unique features, it can also be 
argued that studying how LLCs react to policy is a study of a certain subset of the middle and 
working classes are impacted by government action. From a political science standpoint, 
studying LLCs can more broadly provide a unique perspective on how a group of individuals 
(entrepreneurs) are impacted by, and responding to, policy, and in the era of shifting political 
allegiances and razor thin electoral margins, understanding these groups is an important aspect of 
understanding how coalitions are forming around certain issues. 
 
Limitations of the LLC Approach and Establishing Validity 
 
That last claim is not without potential criticism. Private citizens are not the only ones who can 
file a new LLC with the state of California, and I have found several examples of larger 
corporations filing individual power plant projects as separate LLCs27. Critics could rightly argue 
that new LLCs are not a good measure of grassroots innovation.  
 
However, there are also examples in the dataset of corporations that would clearly qualify as 
small businesses for the scope of this study that also own small power plants28. Further, 
 
27 for example, Mariposa LLC, which owns and operates the Mariposa Energy Project, a 51MW gas-fired power 
plant is itself owned by Diamond Generating Corp, a multinational energy company (Collins Electrical) 
28 such as the Van Der Kooi Dairy Power LLC, a biomass generation facility owned and operated by the man who 
also runs the Van Der Kooi Dairy and Ranch (GovCB) 
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ownership and operation of power plants is only a small part of the energy generation industry. 
There is a wealth of support services, from installation to financing, to engineering consulting to 
parts manufacturing that are needed for the power generation industry to run smoothly, especially 
within the context of small-scale energy like solar. These kinds of businesses appear to make up 
the bulk of the LLCs within this study. 
 
Another limitation of this approach to measuring economic innovation is the ease with which an 
individual with US$800 and a dream can register an LLC, which could give the false sense that 
more innovation is happening than is actually occurring. While combing through the dataset, I 
noticed many companies that came into business then were canceled a few months later. I found 
that several of these companies were tied to one small-time investor who would start a new 
company to submit bids for municipal construction projects, then dissolve the bidding company 
if they did not win the contract29. 
 
Without a doubt simply registering a new LLC in the state of California does not by itself 
constitute innovation. As per the definition for innovation laid out by Baregheg et al, an 
innovation must help a firm successfully win in its marketplace30. Not everyone who starts a 
business will be successful, let alone generate enough revenue off which to live, and the number 
of ways a business can fail is practically infinite. Success is also a subjective term, although 
perhaps less so in the case of business than in other topics of study. Possibly the best definition 
for a successful business is a company that generates enough revenue and profit to justify its 
continued existence for a given length of time. However, time operating cannot stand alone as a 
measure of success. Take, for instance, YouTube, which was established as an independent 
company in early 2005 only to be purchased by Google fewer than two years later for US$1.65 
billion (La Monica, 2006). It would be simply unreasonable to assume that a company purchased 
for that sum of money, and whose brand is a household name worldwide, was unsuccessful, even 
if it technically did not “survive” as an independent firm for two full years. Thus, I will choose to 
look at LLCs that have either remained in existence or were purchased or converted to a 
 
29 there is one renewable power project developer I uncovered during my research, Fred Nobel, who has established 
several LLCs for the purpose of such bids, some succeeded some failed. Those companies are denoted in the raw 
data linked in the Bibliography. 
30 see Section 2.2 
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traditional corporation. The California LLC database differentiates all three of these categories 
clearly, as I will discuss in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
 
There is also the wider issue of some of the assumptions being made about people who register 
California LLCs. This study assumes entrepreneurs are rational actors, primarily focused on 
maximizing profit for themselves while working within their area of expertise. In reality, there 
are many reasons why a person would choose to go into business for themselves, and it cannot be 
stated with absolute certainty that a growth in small business innovation is entirely the result of 
market conditions, although market conditions are certainly a leading factor in determining the 
success of a business. 
 
3.7 Operationalizing “Green” Energy and Categorizing Energy Types 
 
In short, this study will consider all energy production that emits greenhouse gases while 
generating to be “carbon-based” energy, and those that do not “green” energy. This is a 
distinction that will likely generate some discussion among readers, as there is no consensus 
among climate policymakers what should and should not be considered “Green” energy for the 
purpose of carbon taxation, subsidies, and other energy regulations. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (US-EPA) separates energy sources into three broad 
categories: Green, Renewable, and Traditional. As you can see in Figure 3.3, each of these 
categories contains energy sources that both do, and do not emit greenhouse gases.  
 
Figure 3.3: Categorizing energy sources according to the EPA. (US EPA,OAR,OAP,CPPD) 
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Of course the US-EPA also gives consideration to other factors impacting the environment, such 
as the problem with safely disposing of nuclear waste, or the fact that most biomass and 
municipal waste will end up emitting GHG anyway and burning them for energy doubles the 
benefit while also breaking down the worse emissions31 into comparatively better ones making it 
a net benefit to the planet. 
 
Reaching beyond the United States, the United Nations Environment Programme also considers 
Biomass energy to be “renewable” and “clean” (UNEP, 2021) despite emitting CO2 and 
identifies it as the leading source of renewable energy worldwide. Policy advocacy group 
Chatham House took UK and EU regulators to task stating that Biomass energy should not be 
considered for renewable energy subsidies because of their CO2 output (Timperley, 2017).  
 
Unfortunately, for the purpose of testing California’s Cap-and-Trade, CARB has made life 
difficult for researchers: biomass and municipal waste sources of combustible fuels for energy 
may or may not be exempt from the cap depending on detailed specifics (CARB, 2019a), 
although biomass power plants are NOT exempt from reporting requirements for GHG emissions 
(CARB, 2020). Thus, as a researcher, I made a judgement call and decided to include ALL 
Biomass and Municipal Waste as a Carbon source of energy impacted by the GWSA, as it could 
be reasonably argued that the additional reporting to be classified as exempt from cap-and-trade 
counts in a broader sense as a price on that particular form of energy in the form of additional 
cost to monitor and report the data. 
 
The next issue presented by the lack of alignment between policymakers and stakeholders is 
categorizing the energy types themselves. As shown above, the US EPA recognizes 12 distinct 
energy categories. I have found in practice that some of these categories can be combined based 
on the companies that work with each of these fuels. Based on the LLC descriptions provided by 
company representatives on their business registration forms32, it is safe to combine the Oil and 
Natural Gas categories into one. Likewise, the EPA’s Large Hydropower and Low Impact 
 
31 such as methane, which is estimated to be between 28 and 36 times more potent of a global warming agent than 
CO2. (US EPA, 2019) 
32 385 companies with some iteration of “Oil & Gas” in their descriptors were registered in California in the 20 
years of this study. 
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Hydropower categories can be looped into one category, as both operate by having the kinetic 
force of water spin turbines and the differences in environmental impact of each type of plant is 
unrelated to GHG emissions. Finally, I chose to combine the EPA’s Biomass, Biogas, and 
Municipal Solid Waste categories into one covering all non-fossilized organic material 
combustion, as the minor differences in how these fuels are harvested and processed do not 
impact the goal of this study.  
 
Finally, through this research I uncovered another alternative fuel source not considered by the 
US EPA: the fuel cell. Fuel cells are still experimental technology, although there are several 
examples of California LLCs working to research and bring them to market viability. Fuel cells 
react hydrogen and oxygen to produce power without greenhouse gases. While most fuel cell 
companies are researching this technology for the purposes of using it in motor vehicles, which 
is outside the scope of this study, I identified several looking to use this technology for power 
generation and energy storage, and thus felt it necessary to include it as a separate category. 
 
On the following page, Table 3.1 details how I divided the 9 categories of energy sources and 2 




Table 3.1 Classifying Energy Types 
Fuel Type 






Combusts non-fossilized organic 
materials (ex. Plant matter, food-
based ethanol, agricultural waste) or 
gasses captured and derived from 
the decomposition of waste (ex. 
Landfill outgassing, compost 
outgassing) Carbon 
See section 3.4 on the controversy 
among policymakers and 
researchers regarding how this 
category of fuel should be treated 
for climate legislation. 
Coal 
Mining and burning of coal and coal 
derivatives Carbon   
Fuel Cell 
Researches, produces, generates 
power from or stores power in fuel 
cells that react elemental Hydrogen 
with Oxygen. Green 
There is one exception to the Fuel 
Cell category, Carbon fuel cells, 
which would be classified as Fuel 
Cell, but Carbon, not green 
Geothermal 
Energy generated from the natural 
heat of the Earth's crust and mantle Green   
Hydroelectric 
Use the kinetic energy of water, 
including dams, tidal and waves, to 
generate or store power. Green   
Natural Gas 
Lease land, drill, refine, or burn 
fossilized natural gas for energy Carbon   
Nuclear 
Use of controlled nuclear reactions 
to generate power. Green   
Solar 
Researches, produces or installs 
photovoltaic cells on houses, 
buildings, or as large power plants 
and municipal projects. Green   
Wind 
Designs, constructs, or manages 
turbines that convert the kinetic 
energy of wind to generate power. 
Includes both atmospheric wind and 
induced wind (such as from passing 
vehicles) Green   
Multi 
Specializes in more than one energy 
type. Also included in this category 
are companies that specialize in 




Under the strict definition of 
"Green" utilized in this study, a 
company that works with both 
Carbon-based and Green energy 
(such as a drilling company that 
specializes in both natural gas 
extraction and geothermal plant 
development) will be classified as 
Carbon. 
Unknown 
Companies identified as energy 
companies, but specific information 
on what type(s) of energy they work 
with couldn't be determined with 
confidence. Unknown 
 Often times these companies 
appear to be registered to 




3.8 Data Collection, Sampling, and Categorization 
 
Business registration data for the state of California is available from 1859 through March of 
2018 thanks to a public information request by the Los Angeles Times, and made available for 
free on GitHub33. This dataset is cumbersome, but it includes the registration data for every 
corporation and LLC licensed to operate in California, with each classification of business in its 
own .csv file, a text delimited database file that is usable in both Microsoft Excel and Access, 
which are the two programs I will primarily be using for this analysis.  
 
The LLC database contains the date the company filed paperwork with the state, its current 
status34, whether the filing is done by a company based in California or elsewhere35, the name 
and address of the physical business, as well as contact information for agents authorized to 
make decisions for the company. The LLC file also includes a description of the company. These 
descriptions are filled in by the filing entity, and do not follow any particular standard. However, 
they do contain valuable information that will make it easier to identify the LLCs I would be 




On the LLC filing form, the state of California allows the filing entity to fill in their own 
description of the business. This is simply a blank line prompting the form-filer for a “Business 
Description”, and there is no standard set of industries used to categorize businesses. This is a 
double-edged sword for a researcher, who benefits from highly detailed business descriptions 
allowing for nuanced categorizations for studies, but who is also harmed by the inconvenience of 
having to cast a wide net using query functions, then manually categorize the data to fit their 
purposes. While the LLC filing form states that including a business description is required, a 
large portion of businesses in the LLC database have blanks for descriptions. As such it is 
 
33 more recent datasets are available in digital form through the California Secretary of State for a fee of $200, but 
for the purposes of this study and my limited budget, a three-year-old dataset will have to be sufficient. 
34 For a list of the statuses in this dataset, and their meanings, as well as how they were classified for use in this 
study (active vs. inactive) see Appendix B. 
35 the parlance used by the California Secretary of State’s office is domestic and foreign respectively. 
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impossible for anyone studying this particular raw dataset to confidently state that they are 
studying all businesses within a given industry. Rather the researcher will have to rely on 
selecting an inherently selection-biased representative sample of businesses for the purpose of 
their study.  
 
Since the data was already to be selection biased, I focused on trying to capture as many business 
descriptions as possible to catch as many companies relevant to this study as possible. I opted to 
do a *string* search using SQL in Access, focusing on small segments of letters that would be 
found in keywords associated with power generation and common fuels36. I continued to add 
strings and experiment with keywords until I hit a point where I was adding new terms to the 
query and not getting any more businesses in the results. Companies that had typos, certain 
abbreviations, or misspellings in their descriptions would be overlooked through this method of 
querying, although there is little indication that one industry would be more affected than any 





Next, I scrolled through the list of business descriptions and classified them as one of four 
potential broad categories: Energy Sector – Green, Energy Sector – Carbon Based, Not in Scope, 
and Maybe in Scope for the descriptions that were not specific enough to make a judgement on 
without looking at the individual companies37. 
 
After discarding those identified as “Not in Scope”38, I went through each company in the 
“Maybe in Scope” individually to try to identify whether they would be appropriate data for the 
scope of this project. This was done simply through Google searching the company for 
information on the nature of the business it was involved in. Companies that self-identified as 
 
36 See Appendix A for the SQL code containing the search strings used. 
37 for example, “Energy Consulting”. 
38 which included unrelated businesses that coincidentally had key strings from my SQL query such as “Activated 
Carbon”, as well as businesses also substantially impacted by the GWSA but not within the energy sector 
specifically, such as “Gas Station”. 
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“energy companies” covered a variety of fields other than electric power generation including 
beverages and alternative medicine. Those were discarded. Also discarded during this pass was a 
subcategory of financial companies called holding companies which themselves do not engage in 
the energy business but rather hold financial interest in established companies. I treated these as 
distinct from companies specifically dealing with investment in energy companies which engage 
in riskier financial ventures meant to spur development and innovation, rather than skimming 
profits off a known successful entity. 
 
I then went individually through the companies identified as either “Green” or “Carbon Based” 
to categorize them based on the fuel type they used (see Table 3.1). First, I categorized them 
based on the descriptions of the companies provided by the registrants on the registration 
forms39. For those I could not definitively categorize using the company descriptions, I attempted 
to categorize using the name of the company itself, which proved to be a useful alternate for the 
description in many cases40. For the companies that could not be categorized by either of these 
two methods, I resorted to Googling each individually to determine the nature of its business41. 
 
3.9 Data Analysis Strategy 
 
Identifying renewable energy businesses, and having the date they were registered will, when 
combined, allow me to establish trends in the number of businesses registered quarterly both 40 
quarters before, and 40 quarters after, the GWSA cap-and-trade system was signed into law. 
There are several ways I intend to present this data to give a complete picture of the broad trends 
in the energy LLC market.  
 
First, I will present as raw numbers the trend in the number of successful new energy LLCs over 
Q4 1996 to Q4 of 2016 inclusive, distinguished by “green” and “carbon” energy. Next, I will 
show the proportion of successful new energy LLC registrations that were green and carbon in 
 
39 ex. “Solar Panel Installer” would be categorized as “Solar” and “Oil and Gas Drilling” would be categorized 
under “Natural Gas”. 
40 for example, a company called “California Solar Ranch LLC” that had listed its description as “Power 
Generation” was easy to categorize under “Solar”. 




each quarter and identify if and when there was a crossover42. Next, I will address the problem of 
recency bias that is caused by only looking at companies that were still in operation in 2018 
through a comparison with overall trends in business survivorship from 1996-2016 as compiled 
by the BLS. Finally, I will control for other laws passed outside of the GWSA that might impact 
the rate of LLC registration in the energy sector. 
 
Data in all instances will be presented as run-sequence plots, which makes it easy for researchers 
and casual readers alike to determine significant shifts in a dependent variable over time (NIST, 
2012). California LLC data will be presented as a four-quarter43 linear rolling average in all 
cases. The purpose of a rolling average is to smooth out random shocks that may occur, as well 
as adjust for seasonality in time data. According to the NIST, a rolling average “is conceptually a 
linear regression of the current value of the series against the white noise or random shocks of 
one or more prior values of the series” (NIST, 2012). 
 
3.10 Limitations to the Data and This Approach 
 
Establishing the validity of this data and the ability to generalize from my results will be a multi-
stage process that I will briefly detail in this section. First, I will discuss how I will establish a 
plausible causality in this study. This will be done using Kellstedt and Whitten’s four hurdles to 
causality framework. Following that, I will describe how I will establish context validity by 
controlling for two pieces of legislation unrelated to the GWSA, but whose impacts on 
California’s energy market were profound. 
 
Establishing Correlation vs Causality 
 
Unlike in laboratory experiments, establishing causality in political science when looking at on-
the-ground data for a particular polity is extraordinarily difficult, because there is no way to 
definitively control for all possible variables. Instead, Kellstedt and Whitten (2018) state that 
 
42 ie. which year(s) carbon energy companies represented a larger share of new energy LLCs and which year green 
energy companies did. 
43 1 quarter is 3 months, clumped as [Jan, Feb, Mar] [Apr, May, Jun] [Jul, Aug, Sep] and [Oct, Nov, Dec] for every 
year in the study as is traditional for business reporting cycles. 
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notions of causality in political science study are probabilistic in nature, that is to say that a given 
condition increases the probability that effect Y will happen, but does not guarantee it will. They 
lay out four hurdles to establishing causal relationships in political science in the form of four 
questions (Kellstedt and Whitten, 2018: 59-60). 
 
1. Is there a credible causal mechanism that connects X to Y? 
In the case of this study, we will be determining if the implementation of the Global Warming 
Solutions Act (X) resulted in the growth in the number of new green energy LLCs (Y) being 
registered every quarter after the passage of this act. As we will see in Chapter 5, growth in 
new green energy LLC registrations was mostly flat until a year or so after the passage of the 
GWSA, indicating that something happened around the time that the GWSA was passed that 
caused that shift. 
 
2. Can we rule out the possibility that Y could cause X? 
Most likely. Because the effect is isolated to the time after the passage of the GWSA 
(condition Y), it is unlikely that hundreds of entrepreneurs banded together to lobby for 
complex cap-and-trade legislation for the purpose of starting new small businesses (X), and 
even if they had, it would have been more likely they by-passed the legislature through 
California’s referendum system to do so. 
 
3. Is there covariation between X and Y? 
Yes, growth in new green energy LLCs is flat until shortly after the passage of the GWSA, 
then increases rapidly. Further, as will be shown in Chapter 5, the trend in growth in the 
number of green energy LLCs is both stronger in post-GWSA years than in pre-GWSA years 
AND stronger than the growth in carbon-based energy LLCs across the twenty years of the 
study. 
 
4. Have we controlled for all confounding variables that might make the association 
between X and Y spurious? 
There are several variables that I plan to control for when presenting results. The first is the 
growth across the state of California in new LLC registrations regardless of industry, as 
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shown above, but also within the energy industry itself. The results in Chapter 5 will show a 
clear and ultimately permanent shift in the proportion of new energy LLCs, and new LLCs as 
a whole, registered in California that were focused on green energy in the years after the 
passage of the GWSA. Looking at the proportionality of new green energy companies makes 
the raw number of them irrelevant. Yes, the pace at which new LLCs being registered is 
increasing, but the pace at which green energy LLCs are being registered is increasing even 
more than that, eliminating that as a possible confounding variable. 
 
The next potential confounding variable will be the business rate of failure. That is, the 
results could be giving us a false idea that the number of successful green energy LLCs has 
greatly increased when in reality green energy LLCs are failing at a much greater rate than 
other businesses and those registered in more recent years simply have not failed yet. Again, 
there are two ways in which I can show this. The first is by comparing the percentage of 
green energy LLCs registered per year that remained active when the database was compiled 
in 2018 to the percentage of all LLCs. In Chapter 4 you can see the results of this correlation, 
which actually shows green energy LLCs underperforming the average California LLC in 
many years, although that may be an artifact of a low sample size in those years.  
 
The second way to eliminate the business rate of failure as a compounding variable is by 
using business life-length data compiled by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics for all 
American companies since 1993. Chapter 4 will show that California LLCs’ rates of failure 
corresponds well to that of the rest of the US, and thus the BLS’s average 1-year business 
failure rate of 66.3% can be applied to estimate the 10-year failure rate of green LLCs to 
show there is still robust and sustainable growth of profitable small businesses in that sector 
after the passage of the GWSA. 
 
The third and final confounding variable I will have to control for is two pieces of legislation, 
one passed by California a few weeks before the GWSA, and the other a piece of federal 





Other Laws Outside of the GWSA That Will Impact Study 
 
SB 1 – the 2006 “Million Solar Roofs” initiative.  A 2006 California law which dedicated 
US$3 billion in incentives towards installing 3 gigawatts worth of solar panels on Californian 
buildings44. This law was signed roughly one month before the GWSA, and for the purpose of 
this study will be considered as separate legislation that must be controlled for when drawing 
conclusions. This will be done because unlike the other laws discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
Million Solar Roofs program was signed into law before the GWSA had passed and was not 
specifically recommended for passage by CARB as part of the scoping document mandated by 
the GWSA. In order to test for the impact on green energy business innovation of the GWSA 
specifically I will conduct a test in Chapter 5 that will consider only the growth in innovation of 
non-solar green energy companies.  
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) According to US News and World 
Report, the ARRA dedicated a total of US$70 billion for energy related projects, comprised of 
US$50 billion in new spending and US$20 billion in tax provisions and credits. Among the new 
spending, US$6.3 billion was granted to state and local governments for energy projects 
(Ruggeri, 2009). US$453.7 million of that was sent to California and its county and city 
governments for a variety of energy projects, including roughly US$11 million specifically for 
solar development (US Department of Energy). LLCs in the scope of this study also received 
grants through the SBIR/STTR program funded by the ARRA. 
 
Outside of direct funding, this law granted tax relief to businesses and individuals who shifted to 
cleaner energy sources. The EPA’s Local Guide to the ARRA (2009) states that the $2000 caps 
for the residential solar and geothermal tax credits and the $4000 cap for small-scale wind power 
facilities tax credit were removed. The law also contained an extension of the Renewable Energy 
Production Tax Credit of US$0.021/kWh for wind, geothermal and closed-loop biomass energy 
and US$0.01/kWh for hydroelectric power, marine-kinetic, and open-loop biomass and waste 
outgassing energy. Critically, the law also allowed for companies to choose to take this as an 
 
44 the program exceeded expectations, reaching 1 million roofs in 2015 and generating 9gW of power, three times 
the initial goal: (USC Schwarzenegger Institute, 2019). 
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investment credit, rather than a production credit, for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, when heavily 
indebted banks were not lending for risky ventures. 
 
While the precise details of the ARRA’s energy spending and credits are not important, what is 
important is that the law pushed a lot of new funding into clean energy projects, opening up more 
opportunity for new businesses. How to adjust the results and conclusions for this financing is far 
more complex that simply ignoring a specific category of LLCs, it would involve a complex and 
time-consuming tracing of funding contracts through individual municipal governments that 
would be too time consuming for an individual researcher’s master’s thesis. Instead, inferences 
about the impacts of the ARRA financing will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Chapter 4: Data Sources, Characteristics, and Use 
 
Chapter 4 will start with a discussion of the characteristics of the data set as a whole, and how 
the dataset is categorized, including broad overviews of what 20 years of business data can show 
political scientists. Next it will discuss four specific quirks in the dataset and the impact those 
could have on the validity of the results of this study, and how these quirks were adjusted for. 
Chapter 4 will conclude by looking at the broad energy market trends in California over the 20 
year test period of this study and establishing how those trends relate to business trends in 
general in California and the United States.  
 
4.1 Characteristics of the Study Sample 
 
The original LLC database contains 1,772,543 total records dating back to 1984. My first step 
was to isolate the data in the years and geography I was interested in studying, 1996 through 
2016 with a “Domestic Entity” filing type. This was done using a simple query function in 
Access resulting in 1,231,989 records that could potentially be relevant to this study. The open-
ended “business type” question in the database has gathered a sizeable portion of businesses, 
totaling 332,610 out of those 1,231,989 “domestic” records (or 27%) having either a blank 
description or amusing yet ultimately unhelpful descriptions such as “all legal business activity”, 
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leaving 889,389 records from which to query. After running the initial query, 19,173 records 
were left to be categorized. 
 
After the extensive categorization process described in Chapter 3 was completed, a total of 2,930 
California Energy LLCs registered between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2016 were 
identified and categorized. Of these, 1,280 had statuses that indicated they were “successful”45. 
However, there are several quirks with this data set that still needed to be addressed before 
establishing it as the final sample for analysis. 
 
Active vs. Inactive Companies 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I used the “status” column of the LA Times LLC Dataset to determine 
whether a company should be considered successful for the purpose of this study. It is worth 
reiterating that the original database represents the status of these companies as of March 2018 
when it was compiled. In the course of my research, I discovered several companies that had a 
status listed in the database indicating it was unsuccessful that were reactivated sometime before 
Winter of 2021. Likewise, companies that had statuses in March 2018 that would be considered 
successful by the standards established in Chapter 3 have since failed by those same standards. 
Because of the extenuating circumstances of the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, I decided to take the data as it is in the LA Times Database and not attempt to adjust it 
based on new information. This means that the final metric of “successful” company in this study 
would more accurately be stated as “company that was successful as of March 2018”. 
 
Out of State Listed as Domestics 
 
Another quirk of this data appears to be an oversight on the part of the state of California. Of the 
1,280 domestically-filed companies listed as successful, 153 had a business addresses that was 
out-of-state. Because this study is meant to look at the impact on LLCs registered by 
Californians specifically, I chose to pull these records out of the data for the final analysis, 
leaving the dataset with 1,127 companies listed as successful. 
 




Categorizing Multis and Unknowns 
 
88 of the remaining 1,127 successful energy LLCs in this dataset I was not able to categorize due 
to lack of information. The descriptions provided make it clear they belong in scope, but Google 
search results were fruitless in bringing up specifics on the company. It appears some of these 
companies were registered by individuals previously involved in the energy sector who have 
since left but maintain a consulting relationship with their former employers, however the exact 
nature of their work was uncertain, and I did not want to guess at the risk of harming the 
reliability of my data. It is important to note that I chose to keep these businesses in the data for 
internal validity purposes because they met all the other criteria to be included, and they could be 
considered to represent a margin of error for this study. 
 
ARRA Specific Companies 
 
As discussed in Section 3.10, the United States government provided direct financial investment 
to “Green” energy companies with the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act through 
various grant programs like SBIR/STTR. Only 3 California energy LLCs identified received 
ARRA funding. One, Jadoo Systems LLC, was founded in 2001 and had a record of success 
prior to the 2009 grant. The two others, Shakti Battery and Surprise Valley Geothermal, LLC, 
were both out of business by the time the LLC database was compiled and would not be 
considered active for the purpose of this study. Therefore, the ARRA’s direct funding program 
does not have a substantial effect on the results of this study46. 
 
4.2 Distribution of Power Sources in Active Companies Within Sample 
 
In this subsection, I will present a broad overview of what California’s energy LLC market 
looked like at the time my dataset was compiled. I will show the breakdown of successful LLCs 
by their energy category: green and carbon-based energy, then present numbers and proportions 
of successful companies by specific fuel type. The purpose of this section is to give some 
 
46 other parts of the ARRA do have an impact on this study and will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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familiarity with the data and identify energy types that are likely driving trends with the hopes of 
establishing specific programs under the purvey of the GWSA that had the largest impact on 
energy market trends. 
 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 contain a breakdown of the total LLC dataset and the successful LLC dataset 
respectively, subdivided by fuel type. As you can see, the primary energy types driving the 
California market are Solar and Natural Gas. It stands to reason that most energy sector 
opportunity exists in these industries, as solar radiation and natural gas are two of California’s 
most abundant natural resources47. 
 
Table 4.1 All California Energy LLCs Registered Between 1996 and 2016 Inclusive by 






% of the Energy 
Category 
% of the Whole 
Energy Market 
  Natural Gas              649  79.9% 22.2% 
  Biomass and Waste              152  13.8% 5.2% 
  Multi                 37  5.3% 1.3% 
  Coal                   7  0.9% 0.2% 
Carbon Energy Subtotal               845  100.0% 28.8% 
  Solar           1,360  79.3% 46.4% 
  Wind              164  9.6% 5.6% 
  Hydroelectric                 62  3.6% 2.1% 
  Multi                 56  3.3% 1.9% 
  Geothermal                 30  1.8% 1.0% 
  Nuclear                 19  1.1% 0.6% 
  Unknown                 13  0.8% 0.4% 
  Fuel Cell                 10  0.6% 0.3% 
Green Energy Subtotal            1,714  100.0% 58.5% 
Unknown               371  100.0% 12.7% 





47 3 of the 10 sunniest cities in the United States are in California (NOAA) and California withdraws over 12 billion 
cubic feet of natural gas every month (US-EIA) 
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Table 4.2 Successful California Energy LLCs Registered Between 1996 and 2016 by Energy 







% of the 
Energy 
Category 
% of the 
Whole Energy 
Market 
  Natural Gas                 255  79.9% 22.6% 
  Biomass and Waste                   44  13.8% 3.9% 
  Multi                   17  5.3% 1.5% 
  Coal                     3  0.9% 0.3% 
Carbon Energy Subtotal                  319  100.0% 28.3% 
  Solar                 621  86.3% 55.1% 
  Wind                   39  5.4% 3.5% 
  Multi                   26  3.6% 2.3% 
  Hydroelectric                   16  2.2% 1.4% 
  Geothermal                     9  1.3% 0.8% 
  Unknown                     6  0.8% 0.5% 
  Fuel Cell                     2  0.3% 0.2% 
  Nuclear                     1  0.1% 0.1% 
Green Energy Subtotal                  720  100.0% 63.9% 
Unknown                    88  100.0% 7.8% 
Total Market               1,127  -- 100.0% 
1 See Table 3.1 for descriptions of the Fuel Types    
 
4.3 BLS and Data on How Many Companies Fail 
 
By choosing only to look at businesses that were still in operation in 2018 or had been converted 
or merged out, I could be creating a bias towards newer companies which would skew my results 
data in favor of confirming my hypothesis. After all, the longer a business has been around, the 
more chances are for something to go wrong, or for its market to dry up. To combat this, I will be 
utilizing data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics that tracks the annual number of business 
registrations across the country, as well as the age of all established businesses each year. 
Unfortunately, this data is not available broken down by state. Therefore, in the following 
section, I will establish that the survival rate of California LLCs correlates well enough to the 
survival rate of all US businesses that it can be used to approximate how many of the total 




By setting a mark of “survived for 10 years”, we can assume that a business was profitable, and 
therefore successful, for at least some of those years, to secure a livelihood for its owner. This 
will adjust for businesses that closed due to factors unrelated to the market, such as death or 
retirement of ownership for businesses formed in the early years of the study and adjust for 
businesses registered in the later years of the study that might still have runway from initial 
capital but aren’t generating sufficient revenue to seriously be considered successful.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Survival Rate of New Businesses Registered in the US, by Year. (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2020) Notice how measuring only the number of businesses surviving in 2018 could 
bias results towards confirming that more successful businesses were opened in the later years of 
this study. 
 
In the following few paragraphs, I will first provide a comparison of the survivorship rates of 
California energy LLCs relative to all California LLCs to prove that there is no difference in 
survivorship rates between any California LLCs and that trends in the California LLC market can 
be used to broadly compare to national business survival statistics. Next, I will show a 
correlation between survivorship rates of California LLCs vs. those registered in the United 
States to show that California businesses follow the same broad trends as all new businesses 
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within the United States regards to length of time in business. Using this, I will then show that 
we can use the estimate that 33.6% of all California energy LLCs will survive 10 years, for the 
purpose of testing in Chapter 5. 
 
a) Establish that California Energy LLCs have the same rate of success, year-to-year, as all 
California LLCs. 
 
As we can see below in Figure 4.3, the percentage of California Energy LLCs that failed based 
on registration year almost perfectly correlates to the percentage of all California LLCs that 
failed based on registration year, with an r2 of .968. Energy LLCs have seemingly done no worse 
or better than all other LLCs in the 20-year course of this study, thus the findings are sound 
within the context of the Californian economy. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Correlation of the success rate of California Energy LLCs and California LLCs for 




This trend also holds when energy LLCs are divided by the green and carbon categories, 
although the correlations are not as statistically significant, especially with green energy48. This 
may be the result of a low sample size. These correlations prove something important for 
establishing validity in the results: that energy LLCs are no more, or less, likely to succeed than 
an LLC in any other industry when registered in California and thus statistics comparing 
California’s LLC success rate with other states or the national rate can be reasonably used to 
make generalizations about the California energy industry. 
  
Figure 4.3 Correlation of Success Rate of Carbon Energy LLCs and Green Energy LLCs 
respectively to All California LLCs. Each dot represents 1 year. Much of the correlation between 
California Energy LLCs and California LLCs appears to be driven by Carbon-based businesses, 
although Green Energy businesses have a much lower sample size prior to 2006. 
 
b) Establish that California LLCs are Succeeding at Roughly the Same Rate as All American 
Businesses 
 
According to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS), across the whole American economy, of 
the 609,638 new businesses operating in March of 1996, only 436,505 (71.6%) were still 
operating three years later, and only 203,390 (33.3%) were still in operation after ten years 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). In fact, since the BLS began tracking business age at the 
national scale, there has been remarkable consistency in the failure rate of private firms. Around 
 
48 nor is it nearly a one-to-one correlation, with green energy LLCs underperforming other types of businesses. 
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two-thirds of all registered firms will fail within 10 years in the United States and there is little 
significant fluctuation in this rate during recessions or boom years. Figure 4.5 shows a 
correlation between the failure rate of California LLCs and the failure rate of all American 




Figure 4.4 Correlation between the success rates of California LLCs and All US Businesses in 
2018, based on year registered. 
 
The correlation between US and California business failure rates is strong, with an r2 of .7532. It 
should be sufficient to use BLS annual business failure rates data for adjustments to the 
California LLC database results to remove potential recency bias. In Figure 4.5 I have used the 
BLS data to determine the rate of businesses that survive to 10 years. This will be used to 
estimate how many of the 2,930 total energy LLCs registered in California during the study 





Figure 4.5 10-Year Success Rate of American Businesses, Registered per Year. Shows remarkable 
consistency, and a 33.6% average success rate is a viable estimate to adjust data. 
 
Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Results 
 
This section will detail the results from analyzing the data and tying those results back to the 
hypothesis. Section 5.1 will look at the twenty-year trends in successful new energy LLC 
registrations for companies working in both the green and carbon energy industries, first as raw 
numbers of companies, then as proportions of both the energy sector and all LLC registrations 
and finally the year-to-year growth rate across all sectors to identify if specific sectors have 
grown relative to the whole energy market and whole small business market.  
 
The final two sections of this chapter will address two validity tests performed to ensure that a 
causal mechanism can be reasonably implied. First, the problem of potential recency bias in the 
data will be addressed by comparing California energy LLC success rates with data collected on 
business success rates by the BLS to show that even adjusting registrations data to mirror the 
historic ten-year success rate of companies keeps the results of these data, and conclusions drawn 
from it, robust. Finally, there will be a test controlling for the impact of the Million Solar Roofs 






5.1 Green and Carbon Energy LLC Trends 
 
Figure 5.1 shows a trend of the number of successful new energy LLCs registered between 1996 
and 2016 in California per economic quarter.  
 
From this graph, it would appear as though the GWSA indeed was a catalyst for an increase in 
new business registrations in the green energy industry. Starting in Q1 of 2007, the number of 
successful green energy businesses registered annually has skyrocketed, and by 2016, there was a 
ten-fold increase in the average number of successful new green businesses registered quarterly.  
 
  
   
Figure 5.1 Trend in the quarterly registration of successful energy LLCs. GWSA passed Q4 of 
2006, pre-GWSA data is on the left, post-GWSA data on the right. 
 
Statistical analysis shows this growth is highly statistically significant, with the slope of the trend 
line, in this case representing growth in average number of quarterly green energy LLC 
registrations, exceeding both the growth in registration numbers of carbon businesses over the 
same period (Q1 2007 to Q4 2016), AND the growth rate of green businesses from Q4 1996 to 
Q3 2006, as demonstrated in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Statistical Data for quarterly growth in new energy LLC registrations, divided by 
Energy Category. 
Energy 
Category Time Period Trendline Equation r2 Conclusion 
Green Q4 1996 - Q3 2006 Y = 0.04x + 0.18 0.45 
Slight growth, moderate 
statistical significance 
Green Q1 2007 - Q4 2016 Y = 0.75x + 0.36 0.87 
Strong growth, strong statistical 
significance 
Carbon Q4 1996 - Q3 2006 Y = 0.07x + 0.98 0.53 
Slight growth, moderate 
statistical significance 
Carbon Q1 2007 - Q4 2016 Y = 0.09x + 3.6 0.42 
Slight growth, moderate 
statistical significance 
The GWSA (independent variable) was introduced in Q4 of 2006. p<0.05 in all cases. Full statistical readouts from 
the Excel analysis available in Appendix C. 
 
These data would seem to indicate that the passage of the GWSA induced a profound and 
statistically significant growth in new green energy LLC registrations. This result also is 
indicated when looking at the proportion of new energy LLCs that were classified as green and 
carbon over time, shown below in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Trend in the proportion of successful energy LLCs registered quarterly. GWSA passed 
Q4 of 2006, pre-GWSA data is on the left, post-GWSA data on the right. 
 
Looking at the proportion of new successful energy businesses, we can see a marked shift in 
registrations in the year following the passage of the GWSA, where green and carbon-based 
energy business registrations effectively swap proportionalities and level out to a “new normal”. 
Even if the energy businesses for which I could not determine a specific energy source were all 
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carbon-based energy, it would not alter the message from the data: there was a fundamental shift 
in California’s energy LLC market that coincides with the passage of the GWSA. 
 
A further look comparing the proportion of successful green and carbon energy LLCs relative to 
all successful LLCs registered in California over the same timespan, Figure 5.3, shows a 
sustained increase in the share of new companies that were involved in green energy after the 
passage of the GWSA, with a peak in 2010 of 0.30% of all successful California LLCs registered 
that year being green energy companies, before leveling off to a proportion roughly five-times 
greater than it was in the decade prior to the passage of the GWSA.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Trend in the proportion of all successful LLCs by quarter that were energy businesses. 
Pre-GWSA data on the left, post-GWSA data on the right. 
 
These data show a decrease in the proportion of new LLCs that were involved in carbon-based 
energy, but one that is markedly less stark than the increase in the proportion of new green 
energy LLCs. Thus, it would appear that the overall proportion of new energy LLCs registered 
annually has increased coinciding with the passage of the GWSA in 2006. The implication of this 
will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2 Establishing Validity – Results Remain Robust When Corrected for Recency Bias 
 
The biggest criticisms of looking at registration trends of successful small businesses over a 
period of time are recency and survivorship bias. Defining success as either still in operation in 
2018 or merged out or sold inherently biases the data towards younger companies. Given the 
unique business structure of LLCs detailed in Chapter 3, a company can cease to exist for a 
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number of reasons completely unrelated to market forces, such as the death of the owner or 
simply the completion of the project for which the company was founded in the first place.  
 
To prove the data is robust, I will adjust the California energy LLC data to reflect the average 10-
year survivorship rate of all companies registered in a given year. That is, functionally defining 
success as “a company that generated enough revenue to stay in business for 10 years.” 
 
Using the actual success rate data from BLS from the years 1996-2009, and using the average 
10-year success rate across that timespan of 33.6% to estimate the 10-year success rate of new 
energy LLCs registered between 2010-2016, we can confidently estimate how many California 
LLCs remained in business (or will remain in business) for at least 10 years. In Figure 5.4, I used 
these figures to estimate the number of carbon and green energy LLCs that survived at least 10 




Figure 5.4 Trend in estimated registration of California energy LLCs that survived 10-years 
based on all registered LLCs regardless of status in 2018. The transition to a majority of 
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successful companies being green energy based occurring after the passage of the GWSA 
remains. 
 
Table 5.2 – Statistical Data for quarterly growth in new energy LLC registrations for 
companies estimated to have survived at least 10-years, divided by Energy Category.  
Energy 
Category Time Period 
Trendline 
Equation r2 Conclusion 
Green Q4 1996 - Q3 2006 Y = 0.05x + 0.51 0.30 Slight growth, moderate statistical significance 
Green Q1 2007 - Q4 2016 Y = 0.19x + 7.02 0.47 Clear growth, moderate statistical significance 
Carbon Q4 1996 - Q3 2006 Y = 0.05x + 1.29 0.51 Slight growth, moderate statistical significance 
Carbon Q1 2007 - Q4 2016 Y = -0.05x + 4.58 0.38 
Slight negative growth, moderate statistical 
significance 
 
As we can see, even when forecasting the success rates, the change in green energy LLCs is still 
profound after 2006. It is impossible to objectively state energy businesses registered in the 
2010s will always fail at the same rate as LLCs in those industries have in the past. However, the 
strength of the correlations tying their previous success rates to those of other businesses in both 
California, and the United States as a whole, over a 20-year timespan show that in the most likely 
scenario the transition from a majority of successful California energy LLCs registered every 
quarter being carbon based to being green energy based will remain significant. Carbon energy 
might even trend slightly downward. 
 
In these data, we see a stark leap in the number of green energy LLCs first 8 quarters of the post-
GWSA test before it levels off to a new normal, as indicated in Table 5.2 which shows flatter 
growth for green energy LLCs after the passage of the GWSA than in Table 5.1, but with a high 
intercept.  
 
5.3 Establishing Validity – Results Are Altered When Correcting for Other Legislation 
 
Finally, in order to have an idea of the impact of the GWSA itself, we must correct for one piece 
of legislation passed outside the purvey of AB32: the California-specific Million Solar Roofs 
initiative. Since it is impossible looking only at business registration data to determine which 
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solar energy LLCs were registered in response to the GWSA vs Million Solar Roofs49, I have 
chosen to instead remove ALL solar LLCs from the “green” category and showing the carbon 
and green trends without solar LLCs considered. If the induced innovation hypothesis holds, the 
GWSA should have induced innovation in these non-solar green energy industries as well, even 
without the benefit of a massive tax benefit program for adopting the new tech. 
 
  
Figure 5.5 Trends in sucessful green energy LLCs that are NOT solar companies. Refer to Figure 
5.1 for the Carbon LLC data, which is identical. 
 
Table 5.3 -- Statistical Data for trend in quarterly new non-solar energy LLC registrations  
Energy 
Category Time Period 
Trendline 
Equation r2  Conclusion 
Green Q4 1996 - Q3 2006 Y = 0.01x + 0.62 0.02 
No statistically significant trend. P > 0.05 
as well 
Green Q1 2007 - Q4 2016 Y = 0.06x + 0.66 0.35 
Slight growth, moderate statistical 
significance 
Carbon1 Q4 1996 - Q3 2006 Y = 0.07x + 0.98 0.51 
Slight growth, moderate statistical 
significance 
Carbon1 Q1 2007 - Q4 2016 Y = 0.09x + 3.6 0.38 
Slight growth, moderate statistical 
significance 
1 Data is identical to Table 5.1. 
 
As you can see, solar is the primary driver for growth in small business registrations in 
California’s green energy sector. There is still an increase in the raw number as well as the 
proportion of new LLC registrations in green energy after the passage of the GWSA, indicating 
the carbon price and non-solar green energy projects and subsidies have helped some, although 
 
49 in fact, as I will discuss in Chapter 6 it is likely the two worked in conjunction to create a vibrant market where 
new businesses could thrive. 
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the effect is clearly muted. At no point does the growth trend outpace carbon energy, although the 
difference is functionally negligible.  
 
Also of note, at no point in the data set controlling for solar energy does the proportion of new, 
successful, green energy LLCs exceed that of carbon-based energy LLCs, although there are 
several quarters where registrations for each category are identical. 
 
Figure 5.6 Trend in the proportion of successful energy LLCs registered quarterly, with solar 
energy companies removed. 4-quarter rolling average. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This chapter will attempt to draw some conclusions from the results of the data testing in the 
previous chapter. First will be an assessment of the impact of the Global Warming Solutions Act 
on small business innovation in California’s energy sector, followed by an assessment of the 
impacts other programs had on the results of this data. The third section will be a final 
assessment of the results of this study, drawing a final conclusion on the veracity of the induced 
innovation hypothesis as proposed by economists in support of carbon pricing. Finally, there will 
be a section discussing potentially interesting follow-up studies. 
 
6.1 Impact of the GWSA and Related Programs 
 
From the data, it seems clear that 2006 was a turning point for small business innovation in green 
energy in California. The year after the GWSA was signed into law, establishing a firm cap on 
carbon emissions across the economy, green energy LLCs became the majority of all new energy 
companies registered annually, a shift that, with 10 years of data, appears to be permanent. 
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Likewise, growth in green energy LLC registrations as a proportion of all LLC registrations 
began to increase in the mid ‘00s, before spiking to an all-time high in 2010 then leveling off to a 
new “normal” that was a rate of roughly 5x what it was once the GWSA cap and trade program 
was in full effect.  
 
Other programs recommended by the scoping document for the GWSA that were signed into law 
in the years following the GWSA don’t appear to have individually dramatically impacted the 
growth trends in green energy LLC registrations that started in 2006, but nonetheless play an 
important role in the GWSA itself – it showed that the government of California is committed to 
a stable, planned, and transparent phasing in of increasing standards, which removes some of the 
inherent risk of the unknown associated with entrepreneurship. A clear standard for carbon 
emissions on a 15-year horizon, with requirements for adjustments to a 25-year and 45-year 
horizons forthcoming as established by the GWSA and associated executive orders, combined 
with regulatory alignment between public and private utilities as detailed in SB1368, 
commitments to green energy investment in SB 535 and SB X1-2, and deregulation of building 
and financing small-scale power projects on private property in AB 811 can be said to be 
correlated with the boom in green energy companies in the years from 2007 through 2016.  
 
6.2 Impacts of Other Programs 
 
However, establishing correlation and causation are different beasts. There are two main factors 
why I think saying the GWSA can not be labeled as the specific, or even the predominant cause 
of this dramatic change: the Million Solar Roofs program and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. 
 
Impact of Million Solar Roofs 
 
The Million Solar Roofs program was signed into law one month prior to, and thus separately 
from, the GWSA. This program, which was declared an overwhelming success in 2019 installing 
triple the amount of gigawatts worth of solar energy as originally planned (USC Schwarzenegger 
Institute, 2019), offered US$3 billion in direct investment into solar panel installation in the form 
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of tax incentives for Californian property owners. The timing and impact of this program 
specifically does make it difficult to draw a conclusion that the emissions cap-and-trade system 
was the primary driving force behind the rapid growth in new green energy LLCs after 2006. 
This is especially true given how many new green energy companies are involved in solar panel 
development, design, and installation50. It is unreasonable to assume the program had no impact, 
but so too is it unreasonable to assume the Million Solar Roofs program was the sole driver 
behind these changes either. The simple math of an increased price of carbon-based energy 
caused by the GWSA and the financial incentives decreasing the price of installing solar energy 
made the programs more lucrative working in conjunction than separately. 
 
It is also erroneous to think that policy is the only factor in why solar energy companies make up 
the lion’s share of new green energy LLCs, and new energy LLCs in general. The nature of 
photovoltaic technology itself makes it much easier to have small-scale operations51 than would, 
say, a biomass facility. This makes the barrier of entry into the industry much lower for small 
businesses. Solar energy is also an abundant resource in California, and a reliable one, with Los 
Angeles having 283 sunny days per year (BestPlaces, 2016). Changing consumer attitudes is also 
a common effect in the growth or shrinkage of certain industries, and any one of a number of 
factors, including a desire to be less reliant on a public grid prone to natural and man-made 
disasters and wanting to transition to a “greener” lifestyle. Further study would be required to 
determine all the factors that have driven California’s solar energy LLC revolution, and to what 
degree. 
 
Impact of the ARRA 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was passed two and a half years after the GWSA, 
and a scant two months after CARB released its scoping document. As we saw in the data, the 
year following those two events, 2010, represents the peak and new plateau in the number of 
successful new energy LLCs being registered quarterly that were green when corrected for a 10-
 
50 accounting for upwards of 95% of new green energy LLCs registered in some years, and as we saw in the 
previous chapter, without solar energy companies, the rolling-average number of new green energy LLCs registered 
quarterly in California never once exceeded the number of carbon-based energy ones. 
51 such as a rooftop array on a family home. 
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year survival estimate. Refer back to figure 5.4 where point 11, which in the 4-quarter rolling 
average represents the average number of new businesses registered each quarter in 2009, is the 
new high that maintains itself through the remaining 29 quarters of the study. As with the Million 
Solar Roofs program, it is impossible to accurately portray the specific impact of the ARRA on 
LLC registration in California, as it worked in conjunction with the goals and policies set out in 
the GWSA and supporting laws. While direct funding provided to California energy LLCs 
through the SBIR/STTR program probably did not have a profound impact52, direct funding 
provided to county and city governments for green energy projects absolutely did. This poses a 
problem for researchers trying to get a clear view on where LLC growth is coming from with 
regards to the GWSA. The GWSA specifically sets requirements for public power projects to 
produce 33% of their energy from non-carbon sources and provides a small bit of funding to do 
so, but with the addition of the ARRA money, it is not entirely self-funded by the state of 
California.  
 
The ARRA also offers federal tax breaks for companies or consumers that invest in green power, 
which could be taken in addition to state tax breaks, increasing the immediate financial benefit of 
investing in new technologies, which further compounds with the additional cost of the carbon-
taxed traditional fuel. From the perspective of determining whether a societal trend is the result 
of a single policy, however, this muddies the water. As with the Million Solar Roofs program, it 
is likely the additional funds from the ARRA worked in conjunction with the provisions of the 
GWSA to spur opportunities for new small businesses. Further study would be needed to 
determine the direct impacts of the ARRA and GWSA each had. 
 
6.3 Final Conclusions on the Hypothesis – Is Carbon Pricing a Useful Mechanism for 
Inducing Innovation? 
 
In a word, yes, but carbon pricing alone cannot be said to be the cure all and is best 
supplemented by opening new streams of revenue into inducing the development and 
deployment of novel technologies, in line more with what Mazzucato proposes in her theory on 
 
52 as discussed in Chapter 3, only 1 successful energy LLC received such funding, most money for R&D and direct 
investment went to universities and established corporations. 
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government as an entrepreneur, and less with the classical neoliberal model that the carbon price 
alone is sufficient to induce significant innovation.  
 
The GWSA uses the carbon price to establish a firm carbon reduction goal on a timeline that 
allows the market to adjust and plan accordingly, which sets the motivation for change. However, 
the GWSA also commits funding and regulatory changes that reduces the financial risk of 
investing in new technology and creates a new customer base in the form of both municipal 
energy projects AND individual citizens looking to take advantage of tax relief programs. 
Further, just as the GWSA cap-and-trade was coming online, California received a net of roughly 
US$2.5 billion from the US Department of Energy towards energy-related projects, including 
many municipal power plants, which most assuredly created conditions that helped push some 
companies to viability that otherwise would have failed or never been created at all. The GWSA 
itself allows for the creation of an additional energy fund financed through the sale of emissions 
allowances, meaning that the money raised from pricing carbon does, in part, get cycled back 
into green energy projects.  
 
Thus, the conclusion would be that a combination of a carbon price and government spending on 
energy infrastructure effectively spurs small business innovation and expands opportunity for 
entrepreneurs, and policymakers looking to design such a program should be especially 
cognizant of directing funds raised off the carbon price towards business and innovation if they 
wish to open up such channels of opportunity for their constituents. This finding is also in line 
with the conclusions of the quantitative studies by Weigt et al (2013) and Enevoldsen et al (2007) 
on energy production and emissions reduction under European carbon pricing schemes, as well 
as the qualitative study by Gianoli and Bravo (2020) on industry in Rotterdam. 
 
6.4 Recommendations for Further Study 
 
There is a wealth of potential follow up studies on business innovation that this study only 
scratched the surface of. Political scientists interested in the impacts of carbon pricing policies on 
different business structures might wish to do a comparison study of California corporations and 
California LLCs and changes in registration rates between green and carbon energy companies. 
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Still others may wish to compare the different impacts on new business innovation between 
California’s “tax and invest” approach to carbon, to a program like British Columbia’s “tax and 
redistribute” approach where the money raised from the carbon tax is returned as a dividend to 
all residents to spend as they see fit. The GWSA’s commitment to clean energy projects in 
disadvantaged communities would be an interesting field of study for researchers interested in 
climate justice, especially to see if these municipal projects are expanding entrepreneurial 
opportunities for disadvantaged peoples. The size and strength of California’s economy also 
means policy passed there has a ripple effect throughout the US economy. Studies of energy 
standards and small businesses in the other states in the Western US, especially those which 
actively align their own GHG emissions standards to CARB’s could offer a wealth of knowledge 
not just on the economic impacts of climate policy, but increase and modernize our 
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Appendix A: MS Access SQL Code to pull the data sample 
 
#### Pull Business descriptions with relevant keyphrases for easier identification 
 
SELECT LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business, 
Sum(LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.CountOfname) AS SumOfCountOfname 
FROM LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts 
GROUP BY LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business 
HAVING (((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*SOL*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*WIND*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*GREEN*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*ENERG*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*ENV*")) or 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*ELECTRIC*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*POWER*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*BATTER*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*PWR*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*FUEL*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*CARBON*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*NRG*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*SUN*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*TURBINE*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*HYDRO*"))  OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*GEOT*"))  OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*NUCL*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*NUKE*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*GAS*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*COAL*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*GENERAT*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*PLANT*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*PWR*"))  OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*TANK*")) OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*PROPANE*"))  OR 
(((LPMasterBusinessTypesandCounts.llc_type_of_business) Like "*HEAT*")); 
#### After categorizing business descriptions into YES/NO/MAYBE tie remainder to pull the individual companies 
for the final data sample, ready to classify energy category and fuel types 
 
SELECT LPMASTER.file_number, LPMASTER.file_date, LPMASTER.status, LPMASTER.filing_type, 
LPMASTER.name, LPMASTER.mailing_address, LPMASTER.mailing_city, LPMASTER.mailing_state, 
LPMASTER.mailing_zip, LPMASTER.llc_type_of_business, Descriptions_Tagged.llc_type_of_business, 
Descriptions_Tagged.Scope, Descriptions_Tagged.[Energy Type], Descriptions_Tagged.[Green?], 
Descriptions_Tagged.Field6 
FROM Descriptions_Tagged INNER JOIN LPMASTER ON Descriptions_Tagged.llc_type_of_business = 
LPMASTER.llc_type_of_business 
GROUP BY LPMASTER.file_number, LPMASTER.file_date, LPMASTER.status, LPMASTER.filing_type, 
LPMASTER.name, LPMASTER.mailing_address, LPMASTER.mailing_city, LPMASTER.mailing_state, 
LPMASTER.mailing_zip, LPMASTER.llc_type_of_business, Descriptions_Tagged.llc_type_of_business, 





Appendix B: California LLC Database “Activity” Descriptions 
 
Activity 
Classification Code Meaning Detailed Description Successful? 
A Active 
Company is Active with up-to-date 
information Yes 
M Merged out 
Company has been merged into 
another entity Yes 
O Converted out 
Company has converted into a 
corporation Yes 
B Dishonored Check 
Company's filing payment was not 
acceptable No 
C Canceled 
Company license was canceled by 
owner(s) No 
D Dissolved 
Company was dissolved by the 
owner(s) No 
P Pending Cancellation 
Company has filed paperwork to 
cancel No 
F 
Franchise Tax Board 
(FTB) 
Suspended/Forfeited 
Franchise Tax Board has suspended or 
revoked the company's license to do 
business (usually due to tax issues) No 
S 
Secretary of State (SOS) 
Suspended/Forfeited 
Secretary of State has suspended or 




Both the Franchise Tax Board AND 
Secretary of State have taken actions 
to suspend or remove the LLC's license No 





Appendix C: Original Data Tables and Full Statistical Outputs for Results 
Table for Figure 5.1 
Quarter Green LLC pre-GWSA Green LLC post-GWSA Carbon LLC pre-GWSA Carbon LLC post-GWSA 
1 1 2 2 5 
2 1 4 2 5 
3 1 4 2 4 
4 1 4 2 4 
5 1 5 2 3 
6 1 4 2 3 
7 0 4 2 3 
8 0 4 1 4 
9 0 6 2 4 
10 0 7 2 5 
11 0 9 1 5 
12 0 11 1 5 
13 0 15 1 4 
14 1 15 2 3 
15 1 16 1 3 
16 1 16 2 3 
17 1 12 2 5 
18 1 13 2 6 
19 0 12 2 7 
20 1 14 2 7 
21 1 16 2 8 
22 1 15 2 8 
23 1 16 2 7 
24 1 14 2 7 
25 1 14 1 5 
26 1 18 2 5 
27 1 18 2 5 
28 2 23 3 5 
29 1 22 3 6 
30 1 22 4 6 
31 1 22 4 7 
32 1 19 4 7 
33 1 20 3 6 
34 2 21 2 6 
35 2 24 3 5 
36 3 26 4 5 
37 3 34 4 6 
38 2 35 5 8 
39 2 36 5 8 
40 2 38 5 8 
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Statistics for Successful Green Energy LLCs Q4 1996 – Q3 2006 
 
 
Statistics for Successful Green Energy LLCs Q1 2007 – Q4 2016 
 
 
Statistics for Successful Carbon Energy LLCs Q4 1996 – Q3 2006 
 
 





Table for Figure 5.2 
Quart
er 
Green % Energy 
Pre 
Green % Energy 
Post 
C % Energy 
Pre 
C % Energy 
Post 
Unk % Energy 
Pre 
Unk % Energy 
Post 
1 33% 25% 67% 63% 0% 13% 
2 33% 44% 67% 56% 0% 0% 
3 33% 50% 67% 50% 0% 0% 
4 33% 50% 67% 50% 0% 0% 
5 33% 63% 67% 38% 0% 0% 
6 33% 57% 67% 43% 0% 0% 
7 0% 57% 100% 43% 0% 0% 
8 0% 50% 100% 50% 0% 0% 
9 0% 60% 100% 40% 0% 0% 
10 0% 54% 100% 38% 0% 8% 
11 0% 60% 100% 33% 0% 7% 
12 0% 65% 100% 29% 0% 6% 
13 0% 75% 100% 20% 0% 5% 
14 33% 79% 67% 16% 0% 5% 
15 50% 76% 50% 14% 0% 10% 
16 33% 76% 67% 14% 0% 10% 
17 33% 63% 67% 26% 0% 11% 
18 33% 59% 67% 27% 0% 14% 
19 0% 57% 100% 33% 0% 10% 
20 33% 61% 67% 30% 0% 9% 
21 33% 64% 67% 32% 0% 4% 
22 33% 63% 67% 33% 0% 4% 
23 33% 67% 67% 29% 0% 4% 
24 33% 64% 67% 32% 0% 5% 
25 50% 70% 50% 25% 0% 5% 
26 33% 75% 67% 21% 0% 4% 
27 33% 72% 67% 20% 0% 8% 
28 40% 77% 60% 17% 0% 7% 
29 25% 73% 75% 20% 0% 7% 
30 20% 71% 80% 19% 0% 10% 
31 20% 71% 80% 23% 0% 6% 
32 20% 63% 80% 23% 0% 13% 
33 25% 69% 75% 21% 0% 10% 
34 50% 68% 50% 19% 0% 13% 
35 40% 73% 60% 15% 0% 12% 
36 43% 74% 57% 14% 0% 11% 
37 43% 76% 57% 13% 0% 11% 
38 29% 71% 71% 16% 0% 12% 
39 29% 71% 71% 16% 0% 14% 




Table for Figure 5.3 
Quarter 
Green % All 
Pre 
Green % All 
Post 
C % All 
Pre 
C % All 
Post 
Unk % All 
Pre 
Unk % All 
Post 
1 0.08% 0.04% 0.16% 0.11% 0.00% 0.02% 
2 0.07% 0.09% 0.15% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 
3 0.07% 0.09% 0.14% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 0.07% 0.08% 0.13% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 0.06% 0.10% 0.13% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 
6 0.06% 0.08% 0.12% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 
7 0.00% 0.08% 0.11% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 
8 0.00% 0.08% 0.06% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 
9 0.00% 0.13% 0.11% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 0.00% 0.15% 0.11% 0.11% 0.00% 0.02% 
11 0.00% 0.19% 0.05% 0.11% 0.00% 0.02% 
12 0.00% 0.23% 0.05% 0.10% 0.00% 0.02% 
13 0.00% 0.30% 0.05% 0.08% 0.00% 0.02% 
14 0.05% 0.29% 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% 0.02% 
15 0.05% 0.30% 0.05% 0.06% 0.00% 0.04% 
16 0.05% 0.29% 0.09% 0.05% 0.00% 0.04% 
17 0.04% 0.21% 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% 0.04% 
18 0.05% 0.22% 0.09% 0.10% 0.00% 0.05% 
19 0.00% 0.20% 0.09% 0.11% 0.00% 0.03% 
20 0.05% 0.23% 0.09% 0.11% 0.00% 0.03% 
21 0.05% 0.24% 0.09% 0.12% 0.00% 0.02% 
22 0.04% 0.21% 0.09% 0.11% 0.00% 0.01% 
23 0.04% 0.22% 0.08% 0.10% 0.00% 0.01% 
24 0.04% 0.17% 0.08% 0.09% 0.00% 0.01% 
25 0.04% 0.17% 0.04% 0.06% 0.00% 0.01% 
26 0.03% 0.20% 0.07% 0.06% 0.00% 0.01% 
27 0.03% 0.19% 0.07% 0.05% 0.00% 0.02% 
28 0.06% 0.24% 0.09% 0.05% 0.00% 0.02% 
29 0.03% 0.21% 0.09% 0.06% 0.00% 0.02% 
30 0.03% 0.20% 0.12% 0.05% 0.00% 0.03% 
31 0.03% 0.19% 0.11% 0.06% 0.00% 0.02% 
32 0.03% 0.16% 0.11% 0.06% 0.00% 0.03% 
33 0.03% 0.16% 0.08% 0.05% 0.00% 0.02% 
34 0.05% 0.15% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00% 0.03% 
35 0.05% 0.15% 0.07% 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 
36 0.07% 0.14% 0.09% 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 
37 0.07% 0.16% 0.09% 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 
38 0.05% 0.16% 0.11% 0.04% 0.00% 0.03% 
39 0.05% 0.15% 0.11% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 
40 0.05% 0.16% 0.12% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 
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Table for Figure 5.4 
Quarter 
Est 10 yr Green 
Pre 
Est 10 yr Green 
Post 
Est 10 yr Carbon 
Pre 
Est 10 yr Carbon 
Post 
1 0 3 2 5 
2 1 4 2 5 
3 1 5 2 4 
4 1 6 2 4 
5 1 6 2 4 
6 1 6 2 4 
7 1 6 2 4 
8 1 6 2 5 
9 1 8 2 5 
10 0 10 2 5 
11 0 11 1 4 
12 0 13 2 4 
13 0 14 1 4 
14 0 14 1 3 
15 1 14 2 3 
16 1 13 2 4 
17 1 12 2 5 
18 1 12 2 5 
19 2 12 2 5 
20 2 15 2 5 
21 5 14 2 5 
22 4 13 2 5 
23 4 13 2 4 
24 4 11 2 4 
25 2 10 1 4 
26 2 11 2 3 
27 2 11 2 4 
28 2 13 3 3 
29 2 13 3 4 
30 2 12 3 4 
31 1 12 3 4 
32 2 11 3 4 
33 2 11 3 3 
34 2 11 3 3 
35 3 12 3 2 
36 3 12 3 2 
37 2 14 3 2 
38 2 14 4 3 
39 2 14 4 3 
40 2 14 5 3 
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Statistics for 10-Year Survival Green LLC Q4 1996 – Q3 2006 
 
 
Statistics for 10-Year Survival Green LLC Q1 2007 – Q4 2016 
 
 
Statistics for 10-Year Survival Carbon LLC Q4 1996 – Q3 2006 
 
 





Table for Figure 5.5 
Quarter 
Pre GWSA Green 
Minus Solar 
Post GWSA Green 
Minus Solar 
1 1 0 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 
6 0 2 
7 0 2 
8 0 1 
9 0 1 
10 1 2 
11 1 1 
12 1 2 
13 0 2 
14 0 1 
15 1 1 
16 1 1 
17 1 1 
18 1 1 
19 0 1 
20 1 1 
21 1 2 
22 1 2 
23 1 2 
24 1 2 
25 1 2 
26 0 2 
27 1 4 
28 1 5 
29 1 5 
30 1 4 
31 0 2 
32 0 1 
33 0 1 
34 1 1 
35 1 2 
36 1 2 
37 1 3 
38 1 4 
39 1 4 
40 1 4 
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Statistics for Green Minus Solar Q4 1996 – Q3 2006 
 
 









Solar Pre GWSA 
Green Minus 









1 33% 0% 67% 83% 0% 17% 
2 33% 17% 67% 83% 0% 0% 
3 33% 20% 67% 80% 0% 0% 
4 33% 20% 67% 80% 0% 0% 
5 33% 25% 67% 75% 0% 0% 
6 0% 40% 100% 60% 0% 0% 
7 0% 40% 100% 60% 0% 0% 
8 0% 20% 100% 80% 0% 0% 
9 0% 20% 100% 80% 0% 0% 
10 33% 25% 67% 63% 0% 13% 
11 50% 14% 50% 71% 0% 14% 
12 50% 25% 50% 63% 0% 13% 
13 0% 29% 100% 57% 0% 14% 
14 0% 20% 100% 60% 0% 20% 
15 33% 17% 67% 50% 0% 33% 
16 33% 17% 67% 50% 0% 33% 
17 33% 13% 67% 63% 0% 25% 
18 33% 10% 67% 60% 0% 30% 
19 0% 10% 100% 70% 0% 20% 
20 33% 10% 67% 70% 0% 20% 
21 33% 18% 67% 73% 0% 9% 
22 33% 18% 67% 73% 0% 9% 
23 33% 20% 67% 70% 0% 10% 
24 33% 20% 67% 70% 0% 10% 
25 50% 25% 50% 63% 0% 13% 
26 0% 25% 100% 63% 0% 13% 
27 33% 36% 67% 45% 0% 18% 
28 25% 42% 75% 42% 0% 17% 
29 25% 38% 75% 46% 0% 15% 
30 20% 31% 80% 46% 0% 23% 
31 0% 18% 100% 64% 0% 18% 
32 0% 8% 100% 58% 0% 33% 
33 0% 10% 100% 60% 0% 30% 
34 33% 9% 67% 55% 0% 36% 
35 25% 18% 75% 45% 0% 36% 
36 20% 18% 80% 45% 0% 36% 
37 20% 21% 80% 43% 0% 36% 
38 17% 22% 83% 44% 0% 33% 
39 17% 21% 83% 42% 0% 37% 
40 17% 21% 83% 42% 0% 37% 
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Appendix D: Trends in individual fuel type sectors 
 
Trends Within Green Energy 
 
Figure D1 Proportion of Successful Green Energy Businesses for Each Fuel Type 
 
Possibly the most interesting thing about looking at trends in green energy fuel types is the shift 
in focus from wind energy to solar that occurred around the turn of the XXI Century. Of course 
the sample size of companies per quarter was quite small until 2006 which has made the pre-
2006 data extremely noisy, and not much should be read into it. A look at the graphs of raw 
numbers of LLCs show the number of successful wind energy companies registered per quarter 
remained mostly flat across the course of this study. While solar energy LLCs were already 
increasing in proportion of all green energy companies as early as 2002, the raw number of them 














Trends Within Carbon Energy 
 
 
Figure D3 Proportion of Carbon Energy LLCs Registered per Year by Fuel Type 
 




As with solar in the green energy industry, natural gas LLCs dominate the carbon energy sector, 
accounting for 100% of successful carbon energy LLCs registered in 42 of the 80 quarters 
covered by this study. However, the data clearly show a decrease in the proportion of natural gas 
LLCs in the carbon energy sector after 2006 and the passage of the GWSA, and a marked and 
sustained increase in the proportion of biomass and waste gas occurring at the same time. This 
increase can be seen in the raw numbers as well, with a modest increase in the number of 
successful LLCs dealing in biomass and waste energy registered from 1 new company every 12 
quarters to 24 straight quarters with at least 1 new successful company. However, most 
noteworthily is that the number of new successful natural gas companies has also increased, just 
at a slower rate than biomass and waste. 
 
